

Policy for a new generation

Middle East and North Africa

YAANI Policy Lab 2012



**Policy for a new generation
Middle East and North Africa**

YAANI Policy Lab

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors only and do not engage or represent any of the supporting institutions of this publication, nor any of the organisations for which the authors' might incidently work.

Design & Layout: Erika Kramarik

Cover photos provided by Hossam el-Hamalawy and Kodak Agfa under a Creative Commons license.

Published by European Alternatives
London, 2012



Further material can be found online:
www.ya3ni.org

Contents

Introduction	4
by Niccolo MILANESE	
The Importance of a 'Policy-Literate' Generation	13
by Claire SPENCER	
Chapter 1. Preventing Gender Violence	
A Preventive Approach to Domestic Violence in Tunisia	20
by Imen YACOUBI	
The Role of State Institutions in Combating violence against women in Egypt	37
by Muhammad SABER AL-SABBAGH	
Chapter 2. Youth Political and Social Engagement	
Economic And Civic Participation Among Jordanian Youth	50
By Sameer AL-ATTAR	
Chapter 3. Education Policy	
To Adopt regionalization is to adapt Education	68
by Meriem EL HILALI	
Chapter 4. Good Governance and Civil Society	
Civil Society Reforms And Integration: A Key To Democratic Governance In Algeria	80
by Nadia LOGAB	
Chapter 5. Media and Social Networks	
The Press in Morocco: Between Requirements and Reality	94
by Zakia BELLEFQIH	
Authors' Biographies	112

Introduction

by Niccolo Milanese, Lead trainer

The demands of the young generation have filled the world's attention over the past two years, at different times and places. The spark, the inspiration, and some of the most spectacular results came from young people in the Middle East and North Africa region. Their example has given political hope to young people across Europe, the Americas and surely in other parts of the world as well. The generational shift they are fighting for offers an opportunity not only for political change in their countries, but opens the possibility of the re-generation of politics in the 21st century across 'new' and 'old' democracies alike, as well as marking perhaps the seedling emergence of transnational forms of political mobilisation.

Yet if young people burst onto the political stage suddenly over the past years, their demands and aspirations were sometimes weakly articulated and quickly lost amongst the clamour they provoked. That is true across the world, but particularly so in the MENA region where the institutions and experience of youth political involvement – and often policy debate in general – are lacking and quickly suppressed when they emerge. In post-revolution countries like Tunisia and Egypt, the sense of the revolution being 'stolen' from young people who were quickly disenfranchised again is common. In other countries in the MENA region, the youth movements are continuing to press for change but need new strategies. The risks of frustration and fatigue at the slow speed of change - as well as the risk of the rise of factionalisms, reactionary movements or iron-fisted restorations of order – are particularly acute in the MENA region, but again have their equivalents throughout the world.

YAANI – the Young Arab Analysts Network International

Introduction

– is a project to develop capacity in policy analysis amongst young people in the MENA region, with the objective that evidence-based well-argued policy propositions will not only help young people clarify their demands and articulate them over the long-term but also to gain traction and credibility amongst media, stakeholders and political decision-makers at all levels from local to international. It will enable the analysts involved to both become thought-leaders in their communities and to enter into collaboration with other young policy analysts across the world.

Initiated by the British Council and the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, with the support of the UK government's Arab Partnership Initiative, the YAANI project has been running since Autumn 2011. The 38 first members of YAANI were selected through in-country interviews held in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. They have been through a training programme over 8 months, comprising four 3-day training sessions, expert input, in-country mentoring and continuous support. Through an innovative multi-partner methodology promoting comparison and collaboration across and between the countries involved, mutual learning and taking responsibility, the participants have developed a network which benefits from the diversity of interests, backgrounds and approaches of its members. The Network can develop into an important international example of young people collaborating across national borders to influence both policy debate and political outcomes. In countries with little recent experience of participatory policy debate, such an achievement would be momentous. The first generation of YAANI members are still in the midst of a journey which cannot be made overnight, but will become ever more fruitful the longer the individuals commit themselves to it, and the longer they are supported by each other and the partner organisations.

This publication features the first set of completed policy

papers written by the network, and other papers are in preparation. The website of YAANI, (www.ya3ni.org) will feature more of the papers as and when they are ready, and more printed publications are likely to follow as well.

Themes and issues of a new generation

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the political issue of ‘youth’ with the political issues of interest and importance to young people. Young people rightly have views on every political issue ranging from the future of the planet to financial reform. It would be tragic if citizens were only to look out for their own immediate interests and in any case young people also have the greatest stake in the future of all parts of the population. Therefore active participation of young people in discussion and decisions on each issue of importance to the political community is a deep consequence of the meaning of democracy.

YAANI currently has working groups in several priority areas, and selected papers from them are featured in this publication.

Youth political and social involvement

The involvement of young people in politics and political discussion is essential for democracy and social cohesion: young people are an important part of the population – a majority in the MENA region, where over one in five people is younger than 25 – have specific needs, interests and rights and are often less able to influence political decision-making than other parts of the population. The question of how best to involve young people in politics and how to promote active citizenship amongst them is of utmost importance, and

one YAANI thematic group has been working specifically on that. Different international models of youth participation – from youth councils and youth NGOs to quotas in electoral lists – are under study by the group which sees the problem of youth exclusion from society and political decision-making as the key factor behind recent unrest.

In this publication Sameer Hussein Al-Attar writes on youth participation in Jordan, one of the countries that has drawn least attention from global media but where youth movements have been significant. He provides some examples of good practices which could be pertinent throughout the region.

Preventing Gender Related Violence

Gender related violence is a major problem across the MENA region and one the members of YAANI quickly identified as crucial both from a human rights perspective and development perspective. The work-group on preventing gender related violence have identified a significant degree of acceptance of gender related violence by both men and women in the countries involved in the project (perhaps as many as 90% of Jordanian women finding it sometimes acceptable for men to beat female relatives, according to a UNICEF study from 2007¹). Over 50% of women in Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and

¹ DHS study of UNICEF 2007, Results presented in 'Jordan MENA Gender Equality Profile' UNICEF 2011 <http://www.unicef.org/gender/files/Jordan-Gender-Eqaulity-Profile-2011.pdf>

Egypt are likely to be victims of violence.²

The working group on preventing gender related violence have identified that in addition to abuse of human dignity, gender related violence has an economic cost in lost human potential and a higher rate of school drop-outs, and in the cost of treatment to victims. Despite some international commitments to prevent gender violence from all the MENA countries (albeit with important reserves)³, the work group is finding that the policies in place are not functioning: from insufficient shelters for women to lack of enforcement of laws against violence, to the persistence of “cultural” factors such as shame preventing women from reporting violence and some interpretations of religious texts giving justification to gender related violence.

The group is working on proposals including improving the law to make all forms of gender related violence unambiguously illegal and making legal help easier to access; increasing the capacity of NGOs to educate and prevent gender based violence as well as to campaign for equitable understandings of Islamic texts; better monitoring cases of GBV; increasing the number of womens’ shelters and helplines; counselling and

² Moroccan Haut Commissaire au Plan, “Principaux résultats de l’Enquête Nationale sur la Prévalence de la Violence à l’Egard des Femmes (version française)”, (January 2011), available at http://www.hcp.ma/Conference-debat-consacree-a-l-etude-de-la-violence-a-l-egard-de-femmes-au-Maroc_a66.html); see also, UN Women, “Moroccan Government Release Extensive Gender-Based Violence Study”, (10 January 2011), available at <http://www.unwomen.org/2011/01/moroccan-government-releases-extensive-gender-based-violence-study/>

³ Notably the ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Violence against Women with important reservations in all cases by Morocco (1993), Tunisia (1985), Algeria (1996), Egypt (1981), Jordan (1992)

education in schools.

In this publication Imen Yacoubi writes on preventing gender based violence in Tunisia and Mohamed Saber El-Sabbagh writes on the measures that can be taken in Egypt.

Education policy

The MENA region has both a surge in young people and experiences the highest average rates of youth unemployment in the world.⁴ Education policy at primary, secondary and tertiary levels is of essential importance to address this issue as well as to address wider issues around democracy and human development. The education work-group of YAANI is working on all these levels of education across the region and in particular looking at the problems of reducing drop-out rates (particularly at university and in primary-schools in rural areas) and finding the best fit between employment markets and education.

In this publication Meriem El Hilal looks at the ways the regionalisation of Morocco might offer opportunities for reforming education.

Good governance and civil society

In post-revolution Tunisia and Egypt constitutional questions are clearly at the forefront of public concern. In Morocco, Algeria and Jordan, constitutional reforms have been proposed in part as a response to social discontent. The role of civil society is also seen as crucial by YAANI in its role as an intermediary between government and the citizen, both holding the government to account and as a driver of development and civic innovation. The very rapid increase in the

⁴ Ivan Martin, ETF Union for the Mediterranean Regional Employability Review 2011

number of civil society organisations throughout the region since the 1980s (not least at the insistence of some Western powers regarding a highly active civil society as a *sine qua non* of democracy), and the questionable independence, accountability and effectiveness of some these organisations provide a context in which the research question is highly pertinent.⁵

The good governance and civil society working group has been closely examining the advanced regionalisation reforms promoted by the Moroccan King since 2008, the role of young people in good governance in Egypt, and civil society organisations in Algeria and Jordan.

The policy team is working on proposals to ensure that equitable, human and sustainable development are all essential components of any regionalisation plan in Morocco, for young people to have a greater role in local government in Egypt, and for civil society organisations to face greater accountability and scrutiny whilst becoming more independent and sustainable in Jordan and Algeria.

In this selection of papers is Nadia Logab's paper on civil society in Algeria.

Media and social networks

Social networks have famously been crucial in the mobilisations throughout the MENA region, playing important roles both as a means of communication and of coordination in Tunisia and in Egypt in particular, where there were also attempts to shut them down during the revolutions.

⁵ Tareq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael, "Civil Society in the Arab World: Historical Traces, Contemporary Vestiges," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1997), pp. 77-87; and Nawaf Salam, "Civil Society in the Arab World," *Occasional Publications*, No. 3 (Harvard Law School Islamic Legal Studies Program, 2002).

The use of social media has arguably imposed new forms of governance on these countries bypassing traditional media: in Egypt, for example, the SCAF have taken to publishing new policies on their Facebook page in the first instance, and political debate between key players in the revolution takes place in the first instance via twitter, and may afterwards be picked up by more traditional media. Regulation and self-regulation of social networks are particularly sensitive issues given the context, but as social media becomes an important public forum, it is pertinent to pose the question of how to regulate and how to guarantee quality and independence in digital media as well as in more traditional media spheres.

The freedom and plurality of the press is evidently of utmost importance to promote good governance and democracy as well as citizen engagement. Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt are all ranked below 120 in the world in Rapporteurs Sans Frontiers annual ranking for 2011-12. Reforms of regulation of the press are underway in Morocco, and the research paper of Zakia Bellefqih in this publication touches both on the problems in the changing media and publicity markets of size and sustainability and on legal, regulatory and deontological questions of freedom of speech, the ethics and quality of journalists and state support for media.

Social justice and sustainability

Social justice has been at the heart of the reclamations of protestors throughout the MENA region, and YAANI researchers are aware that social justice as sustainability must go together. They are researching this link in various forms, from sustainable development following the Rio+20 strategy to creating a socially equitable pharmaceuticals policy. In a region with such rich natural resources and potential for non-polluting energy production, sustainable development, human development and social justice go together not just in

each country individually, but across the region and across the Mediterranean sea. Quite clearly such considerations are ultimately important for the whole world, and the young generation feels a particular sense of responsibility and urgency to ensure a sustainable future.

Partners and mentors

Young Arab Analysts International is a multi-partner project led by the British Council with the assistance of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, and with the support of the Arab Partnership Fund. In each participating country there are partner organisations and mentors who have been in frequent contact with the participants. These have included:

- In Algeria, Mr Ismail Moudjahed of the Algerian Network of Youth and Students.
- In Egypt, Masr El-Baheya: A group of political sciences scholars born out of Tahrir aiming to deliver knowledge about political concepts and realities to average Egyptians.
- In Tunisia, La Fondation Temimi pour la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Information and in particular Ms Sonia Temimi. Prof Jejel Ezzine of the Ecole Nationale d'Ingénieurs de Tunis.
- In Jordan, the Information and Research Center of King Hussein Foundation, and in particular Ms. Nermeen Murad
- In Morocco, Abdelmajid Bouziane, Professor, Hassan II University and The Mediterranean Forum for Youth.

The transnational organisation European Alternatives has provided support through its co-president Niccolo Milanese acting as trainer for the network and in publishing this book.

The Importance of a 'Policy-Literate' Generation

*by Claire Spencer, Head,
Middle East & North Africa Programme, Chatham House*

Understanding how policy is made, and in turn, how those outside the more formal structures of state might influence the direction and form it takes is no easy task, above all in the foreign policy sphere that preoccupies the research staff, membership and sponsors of the work undertaken at Chatham House. Set up over 80 years ago as an informal adjunct of the British Foreign Office, the Royal Institute for International Affairs, as Chatham House is more formally known⁶ was conceived as a response to the need for more informal policy debate to take place outside official circles. The aim was to generate new ideas and (hopefully) solutions to feed into the more formal negotiating processes of international policy-making, above all in the processes of adjustment to the new realities of Europe and beyond following the First World War.

The Mediterranean and Middle East have never been far from the concerns of Chatham House, even as the link with

⁶The Institute, also referred to by its acronym of RIIA, has since taken on the name of its central London premises at Chatham House

the Foreign Office has been diluted over the years and larger circles of individuals and organisations have taken an interest in foreign policy towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Unlike debate over the future of Europe, however, one element that has frequently been missing in debates over the future of the MENA region has been the voice of the next generation of leaders and activists in local and regional policy.

Prior to 2011, discussions on the European Union's Mediterranean policy, for example, were traditionally dominated by official or semi-official representatives of the states and societies of North Africa and the Levant. From time to time, the occasional, and not always younger generation, academic or analyst would break ranks to put forward a view of his or her own society not necessarily in keeping with the official position or line. For the most part, however, participants at meetings on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative launched in 1995 would offer views on the role and influence that European policies were having on their respective societies, without any commensurate evaluation of how their own governments were performing or living up to their obligations.

This was due, as we were all aware, to the need for self-censorship in states that allowed few opportunities for constructively critical debate on official policy, whether domestic or foreign. Over the years, a newer generation of MENA academics and analysts did indeed emerge, partly as a result of trans-Mediterranean regional policy initiatives that fostered the creation of a number of local 'think tanks' and specialist study centres. Much slower to gain currency has been a broader ac-

Introduction

ceptance of the role that civil societies might play in policy debates in the MENA region, as they routinely do in Europe and the US, whether via the media or through the agency of issue-led lobbies or non-governmental organisations.

This lack of civil society involvement is only partly due to central state restrictions on local activism, where politics has also been a self-restricting sphere over many years. The dynamic unleashed by events in Tunisia, then Egypt, from the end of 2010 into early 2011 has in large part been the struggle of a younger generation to claim their rightful place in the public space of national and regional politics and policy debates. To achieve change, however, they need to do more than try to hold their own governments to account; they also need to engage in understanding their own states and societies, and acquire the skills of analytical thought and reliable information-gathering, of critical thinking, and of identifying opportunities to influence the direction of events, even at the most local of levels.

From a Chatham House perspective, one of the main requirements we see for the future of the region is to nurture a confident set of policy-makers and thinkers capable not only of shaping the future of their own societies but also of challenging many of the externally-generated myths that perpetuate stereotypical depictions of the dynamics and drivers of their societies. From outside, we cannot define or decide what the new Maghreb, new Egypt or new Jordan should look like, but we do need to understand how the generation that now forms the majority of this region's populations see the world they inhabit. Above all, we need to listen to how they identify

and articulate their own priorities for the near- and longer-term future.

What we can share from outside, however, are insights into how policy processes work elsewhere, and how the tools we use to analyse new developments, and the way we go about proposing policy alternatives might be adapted to meet the needs of the newly dynamic societies emerging across the MENA region. Whatever the short-term prognosis for the region, the openness to the outside world is one of the most encouraging characteristics of its younger generations, and one which sets them apart from a previous generation which was more preoccupied with a dominant Europe or the unresolved issues of the post-colonial era. Within the YAANI programme, the role of the MENA Programme at Chatham House has itself been a voyage of discovery, in which certain policy-relevant skills have proved to be transferrable to the new circumstances of the MENA region, and others have not. The process of reform and change in each of the countries participating in YAANI has also been evolving in parallel, and as a backdrop to the work-shops and networking meetings taking place over the past year. Even as we have engaged with the facilitating team and colleagues at the British Council to identify the needs of the YAANI network and support its own internally-driven development, the context in which individual YAANI members have been working has also changed. The rapid pace of developments, above all in Egypt, has been both daunting and encouraging: nothing, it seems, is set in stone,

Introduction

thus nothing is impossible, even if opportunities for constructive policy engagement remain as difficult to identify as they are to grasp in real time.

What YAANI members make of the evolving priorities for their societies is only partly reflected in the policy papers published here. They are a step in a new direction, above all that of finding a voice in policy debates where few voices have previously been heard or encouraged to air divergent views, and where few debates have welcomed informed insights from outside officially-sanctioned circles. It will still take time for any of this to become the norm, or for the youth of the region to be seen as an integral partner to governments seeking to design and implement new policies. In the interim, however, they can nurture and acquire the skills they will need to act when their moment comes, above all the skills associated with 'policy literacy' required to understand how, where, when and with whom to engage to promote better and more inclusive public policy. Equipped to challenge current and future barriers to their participation in the reform and development of their own societies, the YAANI network is part of a much larger movement for change.

The preparation and presentation of the policy briefing papers published here is not the end of the story but the beginning of it, and the MENAP team at Chatham House has been honoured to have played a part, albeit small, in the launching and support of this initiative.



Chapter One.

Preventing Gender Violence



A Preventive Approach to Domestic Violence in Tunisia

by Imen Yacoubi

Despite its commitment to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (which it signed in July 1980), Tunisia's gender situation is far from being satisfactory. According to recent research conducted by the Ministry of Women's Affairs in 2010, over 30% of Tunisian women are victims of physical violence, most of which is caused by intimate partners. Although Tunisia has adjusted its penal code to deal with the question of violence against women, gender based violence (GBV)¹ remains a rampant problem.

Prior to the revolution in Tunisia, the traditional strategies to combat GBV were either absent or limited making it difficult to highlight clear current policies. In the absence of an early preventive approach to GBV in Tunisia, these strategies are deemed costly and without much efficiency. In a transitional political environment, the target of this policy brief is to evaluate the efficacy of the previous strategies implemented by the government to fight GBV, and to suggest recommendations for improving them. In addition, my policy brief suggests looking at the human, societal and economic costs of GBV in Tunisia in order to suggest policies that target the early restraining

¹ Although in many cases GBV and VAW are defined as different terms, the Tunisian Ministry of Women's Affairs in Tunisia defines them as synonyms, which is why my research will use the term GBV to also mean VAW.

Preventing Gender Violence

of GBV through the public health approach suggested by the World Health Organisation² and characterised by a holistic perspective that targets the establishment of primary prevention.

What is Violence against Women?

The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1993 defines the term “violence against women” as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”³ Domestic violence, a more specific type of GBV, is defined by Innocent Digest (N6, June 2000) as violence perpetrated by intimate partners and other family members, and manifested through ‘physical abuse such as slapping, beating, arm twisting, stabbing, strangling, burning, choking, kicking, threats with an object or weapon, and murder. It also includes traditional practices harmful to women such as female genital mutilation and wife inheritance (the practice of passing a widow, and her property, to her dead husband’s brother), sexual abuse, psychological abuse, and economic abuse.’


² Preventing Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women, Taking action and Generating Evidence, the World Health Organisation, Geneva 2010.

³ United Nations’ Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 1993, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>

Three types of prevention

The World Health Organisation defined 3 types of strategies to combat GBV: **Primary prevention**, which targets the prevention of the problem before it occurs; **Secondary prevention**, which targets the immediate resolving of the problem; and **Tertiary prevention** which targets long term solutions. My policy brief will primarily focus on giving priority to primary prevention of violence in Tunisia, and improving the existent prevention strategies.

To implement primary prevention, the WHO suggested the ecological model which is a model which examines the overlapping of different factors leading to violence.



The ecological model⁴

The most important of these factors are: **individual factors**, like the dominant age range of perpetrators and victims; their **educational level**; **cultural factors** like acceptance of violence; **societal factors** like traditional gender norms etc. This model allows the precision of the targeted groups.

⁴ Preventing Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women, Taking action and Generating Evidence, the World Health Organisation, Geneva 2010.

Preventing Gender Violence

Stakeholders

Important stakeholders for this policy brief are:

The government, namely the Ministry of Women's Affairs, as it should address the issue with more rigorous policies instead of mere strategies. It could provide the funding necessary for government-owned shelters with premium standards, and for professional guidance for victims of GBV.

The police and criminal justice sector, which should take into consideration developing legislation enforcement

The health sector, like public hospitals which may consider training teams in the field of psychological health to deal with victims of GBV working in hospitals or who can work with NGOs.

Communities and nongovernmental organizations that address the issue of sensitization with campaigns and educational programs, and which target the limitation of GBV at the grassroots level.

Those working with children and young people, including the educational sector which can raise awareness in school environment.

Importance of the Problem: Why GBV? Why now?

A problem on the rise for Tunisia:

In Tunisia, there has been a drastic absence of research and documentation related to GBV, typically due to the fact that the previous government avoided tackling an issue that invalidated the highly praised reputation of Tunisia's gender policies, an attitude that the international community and mainstream media did much to main-

tain. However, The National Survey on Violence towards Women in Tunisia (ENVEFT), a recent research done in cooperation between the Tunisian National Office of Family and Population (ONFP) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), released on 29 February 2012, stated that 1 in 3 Tunisian women are victims of violence, while 1 in 5 are victims of domestic violence. The survey questioned 3,873 women aged between 18 and 64, living in all seven regions of Tunisia. The intimate partner is the author of physical violence in 47.2% cases, of psychological violence in 68.5% of cases, of sexual violence in 78.2% of cases, and of economic violence in 77.9% of cases.⁵ The results shown by the survey show a high rate of physical violence against women in Tunisia perpetrated by members of the family, especially by intimate partners (husbands, fiancés and boyfriends), which is why my policy brief will give priority to domestic violence.

A Shifting Political Context

The question of women's rights in post-revolution Tunisia has been subject to a severe and continuous political polarisation. During its electoral campaign, the Islamist party Ennahdha expressed inconsistent and often contradictory opinions about the Tunisian code of personal status, ranging from the praising of its egalitarian approach, to the discrediting of its disagreement with the codes of Islam. Many leftist groups regarded it as a sign

⁵ '1 in 6 Tunisian Women Victims of Domestic Violence According to New Survey', March 02, 2012 <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/02/1-in-5-tunisian-women-victim-of-domestic-violence-according-to-new-survey/>

Preventing Gender Violence

that women's rights might be under threat, and reacted accordingly with launching warnings against what they considered a wave of Islamisation. This led into a polarisation of political opinion in Tunisia, which might affect the question of gender equality in a detrimental way. It is important in this context to keep the issue of gender equality outside this political polarisation while highlighting its role in social and economic development, and to place it within the context of human rights protection, especially Tunisia's commitment to the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women since 1984.

In addition, the transitional period in Tunisia has resulted in lush ground for civil society to emerge and detach themselves from the monopolisation of the government that has characterised the debate about gender for many decades.⁶ The proliferation of grassroots movements in Tunisia translates a growing interest in civic engagement among the community that is willing to act to transform the political scene through activism and participation.

The Costs of violence: What if we don't fight GBV?

In evaluating the risks of GBV and its impact on community, the World Health Organisation estimates that GBV results in large losses that can be measured at the level of the individual, the community, and the economy.⁷

⁶ The United Nations Development Report 2005, the Regional Office of the Arab Countries, Jordan 2006.

⁷ Preventing Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women, Taking action and Generating Evidence, the World Health Organisation, Geneva 2010.

In Tunisia, there is dearth of research in this concern, but we can cite a few statistics regarding the costs of violence in Tunisia and in other parts of the world in order to comprehend the impact of GBV according to the public health approach suggested by the WHO:

Physical Injuries: 'Violence against Women' (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005⁸) indicated that 15–71% of women around the world experience physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner at some point in their lives and states that 'intimate partner violence and sexual violence against women in adulthood can lead directly to serious injury, disability or death.' The ENVEFT estimates that 45% of Tunisian women victims of domestic violence were subject to different types of injuries and health difficulties including loss of consciousness (16.2 % of all injuries) haemorrhage (6.7% of all injuries) head injury (1.9%) and bruises (4.6).

Psychological Injuries and Dysfunctional Families: In addition to physical injuries, GBV can be the cause of several psychological damages 'such as stress-induced physiological changes, substance use and lack of fertility control and personal autonomy as is often seen in abusive relationships.'⁹ It results in the damaging of the well-being of children and the family as a whole. This is in part due to increased rates of depression and traumatic stress among abused mothers, and 'the destructive effects of intimate partner violence on the quality of their

⁸ Garcia-Moreno et al. *Science Magazine*, 25 November 2005, Vol. 310 no. 5752.

⁹ Preventing Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women, Taking action and Generating Evidence, the World Health Organisation, Geneva 2010.

Preventing Gender Violence

attachment and parenting capacities¹⁰. The ENVEFT did not point out the psychological effects and the impacts of GBV on the family, but it shows that 56.4% of women claim violence changed the pattern of their daily lives, i.e. their everyday routines and commitments, and if we want to draw conclusions from this, we can say that women's parenting capacities might be shaped by violence.

The Monetary Costs of GBV: More and more attention has been given to the monetary costs of GBV, and more and more efforts are made to document and to measure it effectively despite the difficulty of this task. The estimation can be direct (health care services, judicial services and social services) or indirect (the value of lost productivity from both paid work and unpaid work, as well as the foregone value of lifetime earnings for women who have died as a result of GBV.)¹¹ The National Coalition against domestic violence estimates that the cost of intimate partner violence in the USA for instance exceeds \$5.8 billion each year, \$4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental health services alone.¹²

Although a research commissioned by the World Bank¹³ asserts it is difficult to make these measures in relation to developing countries, some of these countries contributed positive efforts to measure the costs of GBV. The Egyptian Association

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The costs and Impacts of Gender-based Violence in Developing Countries: Methodological Considerations and New Evidence <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/costsandimpactsofgbv.pdf>

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

for Community Participation Enhancement (EACPE)—estimates that the total national cost of women’s exposure to violence exceeds 785 million Egyptian Pounds a year, over three billion LE over the last three years.¹⁴ In Tunisia, no research has been done to document the costs of GBV, yet 45% of women victims of physical violence were object to health problems which clearly indicates that there are considerable and unmeasured monetary losses due to domestic violence in Tunisia.

Current Policies

The Legislative Framework

Both the Tunisian Penal Code and The Code of personal Status include a number of legislative measures that penalise GBV. Article 213 of the Penal code (amended in 2005) states that ‘any individual who willfully injures, strikes or commits any other violent act or assault ... shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of 1,000 dinars. If the attacker is a relative or spouse of the victim, the punishment shall be a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of 2,000 dinars. If the act is carried out with premeditation, the punishment shall be increased to a term of imprisonment of three years and a fine of 3,000 dinars.’ Article 31 of the Personal Status Code (CSP) gives female victims of domestic violence the right to file for divorce, the right to alimony, the right of abode, the right to custody of their children and the right to financial compensation for any emotional or material damages.¹⁵

¹⁴<http://www.el-karama.org/content/economic-cost-violence-against-women-egypt-exceeds-3-billion-le-2009>

¹⁵ Réponses du gouvernement tunisien à la liste des points à traiter à l’occasion du cinquième rapport périodique de la Tunisie, Tunisie, 25 Février 2008.

Preventing Gender Violence

Strategies against GBV

In the absence of clear and definite policies that fight GBV in Tunisia it is more relevant to speak about strategies rather than policies. So far, the Tunisian government and civil society has dealt with GBV with only secondary and tertiary prevention through a number of strategies:

- A strategy to combat GBV launched by the National Office of Family and Population in 2007 as 'the National Strategy for the Prevention of Violence within the Family and Society' and announced in 21 June 2012 in a conference that gathered the minister of women's affairs and several NGO's in Tunis.

- A number of hotlines which provide legal help and psychological counselling to the victims of violence; they consist of:

- 1) free of charge hotline (80100707), established in November 2008 by the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

- 2) paying hotline, one of which is managed by the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women, while the other is managed by the National Union of Tunisian Women.

- A counseling and support centre for women victims of violence (CEOFVV) established and managed by the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women Since 1993, and which is created to provide psychological support and legal counseling for the victims of violence.¹⁶

A centre for research and documentation: Credif (Centre de Recherches, d'Etudes de Documentation et d'Information sur la Femme)

¹⁶ Women's Rights in Tunisia Alternative Report Submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Session, October 2010 by the Association tunisienne des femmes democrates.

Limitations of Existing Policies

In the absence of primary prevention, secondary and tertiary prevention so far available in Tunisia are not only costly, but ineffective in combating GBV – as the statistics of the ENVEFT revealed. Without primary prevention, GBV might increase, leading to the amplification of its costs. In the absence of media campaigns and educational programs based on the gender and human rights approach and which targets not only women but also males – who are the greatest perpetrators of domestic violence – the number of traumatised children who will themselves perpetrate violence in the future will continue to rise.

The strategies already adopted pose certain problems:

- Although the Tunisian government is showing a serious intention to work on the issue of GBV through carrying on the strategy started by the previous government, this step may show little inclination to develop policies that cut with the past in a radical way and to invest a revolutionary approach that fits the transitional situation in Tunisia.
- In the absence of immediate solutions for victims of GBV, like shelters, the role of hotlines will be more costly than effective. Besides legal counselling, the hotlines are supposed to direct victims to the counselling centre directed by the ATFD.¹⁷ Yet with only 1 centre of its type, and with very little financial support from the authorities, the impact of hotlines is clearly highly limited.
- The only existing shelter for victims is located in Tunis. This poses a serious problem for victims of domestic violence in

¹⁷ *ibid*

Preventing Gender Violence

the interior regions.

- Media campaigns play a major role in making existing policies known. In Tunisia, the free hotline managed by the Ministry of Women's Affairs received only 1723 calls between November 2008 and March 2011, which reveals that victims of domestic violence are badly informed about it.
- Only 17.9% of victims of GBV in Tunisia complain to the local authorities. Different factors could be behind this such as the absence of information and orientation for victims of GBV, and the laxity of the police executive structure in enforcing law against perpetrators.
- The absence of professional teams in the health sector and in the judicial sector entitled to deal with victims of GBV.
- A short sightedness on the side of the government and civil societies in taking into consideration the undertones of the Tunisian cultural sensitivities. If we learn that 42.1% talked to no one nor asked help, knowing that the reasons behind this is that 55% see violence as an ordinary thing, and 7.7% were prevented by shame and fear of stigmatisation¹⁸, we can draw the conclusion there is a need to build models which can understand these specificities. Shame and fear of stigmatisation result from the cultural acceptance of violence against women, partly steeped in a religious attitude that sees it part of the husband's duty to 'correct' the behaviour of the wife through beating her, and partly related to the prevalence of the accepted notions of masculinity and manhood that justify violence against women.

¹⁸ Projet De Coopération Onfp/Aecid «Promotion De L'équité De Genre Et Prévention De La Violence A L'égard Des Femmes», Enquete Nationale Sur La Violence A L'égard Des Femmes En Tunisie 2010.

Alternatives: Dealing with the Roots of Violence

The ecological model introduced previously and which scans the overlapping factors of violence could be used fruitfully in order to design a policy to address primary prevention. To apply it to the Tunisian context, one can primarily focus on the nature of victims and perpetrators. In Tunisia, partners and family members are the most frequent perpetrators of violence, so the integration of a preventive approach should target couples in the first place (like the integration of counseling), or young people planning to get married. In addition, GBV is more likely to happen among uneducated partners than among educated partners, so educational programs that take account of the needs of their audience is vital, specifically addressing the needs of non-educated people. The cultural attitude toward GBV in Tunisia is characterized by general acceptance of violence. Most victims of intimate partner violence talk to family and find it hard to speak about violence outside family, 55% of victims see violence as an ordinary thing, 7.7% are prevented from reporting or speaking about it by shame and fear of stigmatisation¹⁹. In this case, civil society should implement programs and campaigns that seek to dissolve the shame related to the issue by encouraging women to speak in women's groups, and to implement ideals of social justice in educational packages that are adapted to the social textures of their audience.

¹⁹ Enquête nationale sur la violence à l'égard des femmes En Tunisie, rapport principal, The UN Secretary General's Database Women <http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Enquete%20violence%20femmes%20Tunisie%20-%20Rapport%20-%202010.pdf>

Preventing Gender Violence

Recommendations

Introducing a Work Plan for Primary Prevention of GBV in Tunisia:

- Launching educational workshop for adults to raise awareness about GBV. The Stepping Stones program for instance 'designed in response to the vulnerability of most women, men and young people in decision-making regarding sexual behaviour, through men's gendered patriarchal domination of women and older people's generally repressive attitudes towards youth'²⁰ is an excellent example of such trainings which took place in several developing countries in Africa, central and Southern America and Asia and which could be implemented in Tunisia.

- Encouraging couple counselling as a way to provide peaceful platforms of dialogue between women who suffer from intimate partner violence and their partners, and in order to offer privacy when resolving the problem of domestic violence. This could be achieved through both government and civil society. In Tunisia, prior to divorce, the courts recommend compulsory 'reconciliation sessions'. This could be carried further by providing counselling for married couples who face difficulties resulting from intimate partner violence.

- Dating violence is dominant among Tunisian teenagers and youth. Targeting male teenagers and boys with education on human rights in schools that raises awareness about

²⁰ Stepping Stones, What is it? http://www.stepsstonesfeedback.org/index.php/About/What_is_it/gb

the gender issue is important in this context. Educational programs which target boys and men must show how prevailing notions of manhood are harmful to men not only to women, as they often increase men's own vulnerability to injury and other health risks and create risks and vulnerability for women and girls.²¹

- The debate about the exclusion of religious discourse in the gender debate has proven unfruitful in Muslim countries, and particularly in Tunisia prior to the revolution. The post-revolution era may necessitate the substitution of this attitude with the reinterpretation of the traditional religious and cultural norms regarding GBV. Malaysia passed a law that criminalises violence against women in 1996 which resulted from a large campaign by women's groups about the necessity of imposing gender equality as a cornerstone of the Islamic faith. Initiatives like "Musawah," (or Equality) which was launched in 2009 in Malaysia to 'build a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family'²² could be a good example. A similar model could be followed in Tunisia, as the UNDP 2005 recommended using a moderate Islamic approach in gender reform in the Arab countries, due to the inseparability of reli-

²¹ Preventing intimate partner and sexual violence against women, taking action and generating evidence, the World Health Organisation,, Geneva 2010

²² Today's Zaman, 29 April 2010, Zainah Anwar: Arab Spring Opens Window of Opportunity for Women in Mideast http://www.today-szaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=278896

Preventing Gender Violence

gious belief from everyday life.

- Economic independence can help women stand against intimate partner violence, especially for those who are financially dependent on abusive husbands, so it is vital in this context to empower women with limited financial means and who are subject to violence from their partners through loans and micro credits.

Improving the Existing Prevention Modes:

- Increasing the number of shelters in different regions, proliferating professional psychological and physical health care within them, and disseminating knowledge about them. The counselling and support centre for women victims of violence established by the ATFD has many financial difficulties and receives very little funds from the authorities, even though the hotline established by the government directs women victims of violence to precisely this centre.²³

- As only 17.9% of the victims of intimate partner violence in Tunisia complain to the local authorities according to The National Survey on Violence towards Women in Tunisia²⁴, it is important to consider how to make access to legal help easier and less complicated. Civil society for instance could do an important job in this regard, as it could offer training to women's groups as how to have access to legal help.

²³ Women's Rights in Tunisia Alternative Repor Submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Session, October 2010 by the Association tunisienne des femmes democrats.

²⁴ Enquête nationale sur la violence a l'égard des femmes En Tunisie, rapport principal, The UN Secretary General's Database Women <http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Enquete%20violence%20femmes%20Tunisie%20-%20Rapport%20-%202010.pdf>

References

Claudia Garcia-Moreno et al. Science Magazine, 25 November 2005, Vol. 310 no. 5752

'Economic Costs of violence against women in Egypt', <http://www.el-karama.org/content/economic-cost-violence-against-women-egypt-exceeds-3-billion-le-2009>

Engaging Boys and Men in GBV Prevention and Reproductive Health in Conflict and Emergency-Response Settings - A Workshop Module, The Acquire Project, New York 2008

Enquête nationale sur la violence à l'égard des femmes En Tunisie, rapport principal, The UN Secretary General's Database Women <http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Enquete%20violence%20femmes%20Tunisie%20-%20Rapport%20-%202010.pdf>

Morrison, Andrew and Orlando Maria Beatriz, 'The Costs and Impacts of Gender based Violence in Developing Countries'

Preventing intimate partner and sexual violence against women, taking action and generating evidence, the World Health Organisation, Geneva 2010.

The costs and Impacts of Gender-based Violence in Developing Countries: Methodological Considerations and New Evidence <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/>

INTGENDER/Resources/costsandimpactsofgbv.pdf

Projet De Coopération Onfp/Aecid «Promotion De L'équité De Genre Et Prévention De La Violence A L'égard Des Femmes», Enquête Nationale Sur La Violence A L'égard Des Femmes En Tunisie 2010

Stepping Stones, Training Package on Gender, Communication and HIV http://www.steppingstonesfeedback.org/index.php/About/What_is_it/gb

The United Nations Development Programme report 2005, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Jordan 2006.

Today's Zaman, 29 April 2010, Zainah Anwar: Arab Spring opens window of opportunity for women in Mideast http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=278896

Women's Rights in Tunisia Alternative Report Submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Session, October 2010 by the Association tunisienne des femmes démocrates.

'1 in 6 Tunisian Women Victims of Domestic Violence According to New Survey', March 02, 2012 <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/02/1-in-5-tunisian-women-victim-of-domestic-violence-according-to-new-survey/>

Preventing Gender Violence

The Role of State Institutions in Combating violence against women in Egypt

by Muhammad Saber al-Sabbagh

Introduction

Violence against women is a phenomenon that affects almost all societies. In the Middle East and North Africa, the issue has not received sufficient required attention. The changing political situation in Egypt presents an opportunity to raise the issue again as a fundamental question of respect of human rights.

Despite the existence of some legal protection still there are many forms of discrimination in Egypt due to the gap between the law and its implementation. This situation arises from social and cultural factors related often to material conditions determining the position and status of women in society. This is in addition to the limited legal awareness among women and some prevalent customs and traditions.

The human rights approach

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹ confirms the principle of equality and non-discrimination. It points to the fact that all human beings are born free with equal rights and duties without any discrimination based on race, colour, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth, or any other status, and without discrimination between men and women.

The Declaration of the Convention for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the General Assembly in December 1993 and approved by all UN member states adopted the following definition of violence against women:

any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.²

Egypt signed the CEDAW in 1980, and ratified it in 1981. However, Egypt's approval of the Convention was not absolute, as it had reservations on 4 articles: Article (2) that prohibits discrimination in the constitutions and legislation of states; Article (16) related to family laws; Article (9) related to laws on granting citizenship and residence rights to the woman; and

¹ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: <http://www.un.org/ar/documents/udhr/>

² Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>

Preventing Gender Violence

Article (29) related to filing disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Convention by member states to the International Court of Justice.³

Forms and manifestations of gender-based violence in Egypt:

Violence against women is practised in two forms in Egypt: the official and unofficial. Official violence is conducted by official authorities and is backed by lack of legal protection and the deficient protection of women by the law, or by the loopholes creating gaps between provisions and implementation. The unofficial form of violence, which is the focus of this paper, is the form practised within the family and society driven by an unjust legacy of customs and traditions that allow family and society at large to commit injustices against women, punishing them for acts deemed wrong by these traditions – even when these are for their rights – such as the demand made by a woman for her inheritance.

Domestic violence:

According to the official Demographic and Health Survey of 2005, one-third of Egyptian women are subjected to physical harm by their spouses. The Survey maintained that 7% are often beaten. Most of these women have lived in silence and never reached out for help.⁴ In the 2007 report by the Land

³ <http://www.egyptiancedawcoalition.org/resources/eg%20reservations%20on%20cedaw.aspx>

⁴ El-Zanaty, Fatma and Ann Way. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey, Cairo, Egypt: Ministry of Health, El-Zanaty and Associates, and Macro International, 2005.

Centre for Human Rights on Violence Against Women, 44 crimes related to marital disputes were reported where violence by the husband led to the murder of 29 women.⁵ Most of the crime motives were related to financial issues (such as household expenses), suspicion of the wife's conduct, libelling the wife or the divorced woman out of vengeance, the rejection of returning to the divorcing husband, and sometimes the motive is not known.

The Egypt Demographic and Health Survey (EDHS) of 2005⁶ illustrated that violence against women in Egypt, especially domestic violence, is entrenched among women who have a lower status in the family and the society. For example, the stigma of being divorced subjects the Egyptian woman who was formerly married to a very high risk in terms of abuse. On the basis of the survey such a woman would be doubly at risk to physical abuse by her new husband compared to a woman who was not married before.

Women who are poor and less educated, as well as those who get married at an early age are the most vulnerable to domestic violence, compared to women who marry at a later age and who receive higher education. Gender-based violence is also more prevalent among women who belong to the lower classes, and is about twice as frequent as among women who belong to higher classes. However, generally speaking, there is

⁵ The Land Center for Human Rights, *The Economic and Social Rights Series*, issue n° 52, January, 2007.. available on www.lchr-eg.org

⁶ El-Zanaty, Fatma and Ann Way. *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey*, Cairo, Egypt: Ministry of Health, El-Zanaty and Associates, and Macro International ,2008 .

Preventing Gender Violence

no part of society which is immune to gender violence: 14% of the women who completed their high school education at least have stated being subjected to domestic violence.

The EDHS showed that 47% of married, divorced, and widowed women had been subjected to physical violence since the age of fifteen. Most of the time, the husband was the main culprit. The rates of physical and sexual violence (excluding psychological violence) reached 34%. According to Amnesty International, almost 250 women in Egypt were murdered during the first half of the year 2007 by either a cruel husband or one of the family members.

A study on violence against women in Egypt⁷ stated that more than half of the unmarried young women mentioned that they have sustained violence at the hands of their brothers (57.1%) and their fathers (56.5%). The sweeping majority of young women also stated that they have been subjected to at least one of form of psychological violence by parents and siblings, 78% and 80% respectively.

The economic cost of violence against women in terms of preventive response and the cost of lost opportunities such as lower productivity due to repeated absence, and the high cost of healthcare are very high. The public sector or businesses bear the brunt of the cost of the public services involved, including the judiciary, healthcare, shelters, social services for women and children, and civil legal aid services. There are also implicit costs related to lower labour and productivity and the partial loss of income for women. Employers therefore lose

⁷ The National Council for Women, A Study of violence against Women, A Summary of Findings, April , 2010.

on the level of outputs or bear more costs through sick leave taken by victims of violence. The state also loses part of the income arising from taxes. More importantly, there is a cost in the pain and torture sustained by women, and the consequences to the children.

Current policies

There are several legal, governmental and non-governmental institutional mechanisms active in the field of combatting violence against women. Current and recent initiatives taken inside Egypt which touch on gender related violence include the following:

1. Governmental level

1. In 1996, the Egyptian government emphasized in its report on the CEDAW increasing education opportunities for girls, especially in rural areas. Women currently represent the majority of students enrolled in university education.

2. The Ministry of Health and Population issued as per a decree the decision of prohibiting Female Genital Mutilation in 1997, which was supported by the State Council. This decision was based on the Criminal Code that prohibits harming the human body, except for medical purposes, without explicitly providing for Female Genital Mutilation.

3. The parliament in January 2000 amended the Personal Status Law to enable women to file for divorce from husbands without necessarily having to prove that the husbands were abusive.

4. Egyptian courts revoked in the autumn of 2000 laws prohibiting women from obtaining passports or travelling abroad without the prior permission of their husbands or parents.

Preventing Gender Violence

5. The Social Security Law was issued in 2000, in addition to the Family Courts Law and the Law governing a system for family insurance.

6. A woman was appointed a judge in the Supreme Constitutional Court for the first time in history in 2003. The Judicial Council nominated barrister Tahani al-Jibali for this post. The decision was deemed a paradigm shift towards enabling women to attain high positions.

7. In the field of domestic violence, which is a key issue in Egypt, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Security opened 150 counselling and psychotherapy offices to support victims of domestic violence in Egypt.

II. NGO initiatives

1. Several NGOs established centres for legal and social aid for victims of violence from among women, offering referral services and raising awareness of women around their rights and the way to access these rights.

2. Gender-responsive training programmes were developed for both men and women to encourage work relations based on non-discrimination and respect of difference and diversity.

3. NGOs and political parties coordinated workshops and research on the issue of violence against women and its consequences.

4. NGOs put pressure on the government through campaigns, demonstrations, and conferences and through the use of media to change the current reality of women and laws that comprise flagrant violation against women.

5. NGOs support unions and the private sector to achieve gender equality in appointment to posts on all levels.

Despite the great efforts exerted by NGOs, they are limited

to awareness raising and providing aid. This is due to governmental restrictions on their work and the restrictions imposed by the NGO law and other laws limiting freedoms. Moreover, access to information from official agencies is very limited, which is an indication that this phenomenon is widespread.

Policy options:

There are several international examples of initiatives which could be considered for application in Egypt. We will consider two initiatives from Malaysia and Bahrain.

The experience of Malaysia in preparing couples to be married:

The experience of Malaysia to prepare couples to be married by providing training sessions is valuable. Every new bridegroom is given paid leave to attend a one-month course to learn the arts of marital life and ways of dealing with his partner, mutual respect, means for resolving conflicts. This programme started in 1992 at a time when the divorce rate was 32%. Later the percentage dropped to 7%, which is the lowest divorce rate worldwide.⁸ This is in addition to low rates of domestic violence. This programme is characterized by the following ⁹:

1. A compulsory medical checkup is conducted – as is the case in Egypt – and the report is issued by a certified centre.
2. The programme covers legal and social aspects, communication and dialogue skills, health, family management, and

⁸ <http://www.alriyadh.com/2008/07/01/article355075.html> and <http://islamtoday.net/nawafeth/artshow-47-151818.htm>

⁹ www.jawwad.org

Preventing Gender Violence

dealing with marital issues.

3. The programme is conducted by certified trainers offered by accredited centres under the supervision of the Administration of Islamic Affairs.

4. The programme is offered in specialized centres, and could be conducted in mosques, in rural areas and remote towns.

5. The programme provides 6 trainers for each group, each in his/ her specialization. Each training session is followed by a question/answer time.

6. The curriculum is unified for all of Malaysia, the material printed, and the fees do not exceed EGP 150.

7. The programme is offered to both young men and women, and NGOs and charity organizations participate to cover the funds needed for this collaborative effort.

Draft Bahraini Law to Combat Domestic Violence: ¹⁰

Bahrain has no specific laws concerning violence against women. Since 2010, the King has established a national commission to protect the family against violence. The tasks of the commission were as follows

Develop national plans of action to promote the protection of victims nationally against all forms of violence.

Drafting a set of laws to undertake a preventive approach towards all forms of violence. The provision of public officers of

¹⁰<http://www.genderclearinghouse.org/upload/Assets/Documents/pdf/EtudeFemViolenceBahrain.pdf>

the state and officials with the laws and regulations calling for the implementation of policies combating violence against women. This is in addition to training them to raise awareness concerning the needs of the victim.

In cooperation with the state, the following is implemented:

Awareness campaigns among citizens around the negative aspects of using violence within the family and the psychological damage caused to the family.

Publishing information and data related to prevention to reduce the rates of violence. The Commission also commissions the Ministry of Media to produce television and radio programs for legal, psychological, and social awareness to confront violence.

This experience, however, can be criticized for its lack of reference to economic factors leading to the phenomenon of domestic violence, including poverty and unemployment (of both men and women). The phenomenon is multifaceted and therefore, restricting this phenomenon requires listing all factors without focusing on some and neglecting others. The Bahraini draft law ignores the role of CSOs working in the field. Thus, it failed to propose a role for CSOs in cooperating with the national commission that is supposed to address the issue.

Preventing Gender Violence

Recommendations

We can make the following recommendations for Egypt for immediate measures to address gender violence:

- Promotion of the role of clerics, especially in rural areas, to raise awareness concerning the risks of domestic violence, given the high illiteracy rates and the deep trust in the institution of religion.
- The importance of intervention by the state legislatively and legally to support the work of NGOs cannot be over-emphasised. The government should issue legislation incriminating all forms of violent practices against women.
- There is a need for educational material raising awareness of the dimensions of violence against women at all levels of society. The state should play an active role in the media by launching media campaigns to raise awareness around violence against women.
- Collaboration between government and CSOs and to bridge gaps in government action with respect to establishing shelters within Arab countries and to access technical and financial support from the countries that already have shelters for women who are victims of violence.



Chapter Two

Youth Political and Social Engagement



Economic And Civic Participation Among Jordanian Youth

By Sameer Al-Attar

Introduction

Jordanian society is considered to have a largely youthful population, where people under the age of 30 represent 67.8% of the entire population, approximately 4.24 million in numbers. Young people in the age-range of 15 to 24 years-old represent 21.5%, or approximately 1.34 million, of Jordan's 6.249 million total population.¹ Hereafter this policy brief focuses on young people in this age group.

The official unemployment rate among economically active young people is 29.9% according to the Department of Statistics (DoS). Only 1.6% of them are registered members of any kind of civil institution, and 3.9% regularly participate in civic activities. Most young people do not understand how being engaged civically benefits them directly, or how such activities could play a positive role in their lives².

Increasing youth participation in both civic and economic activities is a necessary part of creating a more vibrant future for the Kingdom of Jordan. It is necessary for the government to take an active role in creating policies and programmes to

¹ Jordan Department of Statistics Web Site, www.dos.gov.jo, 2011.

² 2009 Rapid Community Assessment conducted by the International Youth Foundation with the support of Mahara and the Jordanian Ministry of Social Development

Youth Political and Social Engagement

facilitate the involvement of youth both directly and through active partnerships with other organizations. High-level policy in this respect is important but only as a guide for meaningful programmes which may be associated with it. Without concrete steps towards implementation, current policy remains theoretical and fails to translate to substantial change. For this reason, future policy should be accompanied by measures for the implementation of that policy.

The Higher Council for Youth has been organized to address problems facing youth but is not focused on the problem of low levels of youth participation outlined above. This policy brief suggests ways in which the objectives and focus of the Higher Council for Youth should be changed to focus on the specific problem of youth participation and relevance to youth needs. This entails not only changing the underlying focus but also requires adopting specific programmes to ensure the application of policy.

The Arab Spring

On December 18th 2010, a young unemployed Tunisian man named Mohamed Bouazizi, burned himself to death in protest at corrupt police seizing the fruits and vegetables he was selling without a vendor permit. This event served as a lightning rod for public frustration with unemployment in the region and as a result hundreds of youth took to the streets protesting and rioting in an unprecedented expression of disapproval toward a government in the Arab Middle East. These protests gained strength and sparked similar protests culminating in a wave of unrest that swept over Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. Within months, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had fled Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign ending a 30 year presidency. The following August, Libyan dictator

Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown and later killed following a violent and bloody period of rebellion.

The protests have shared techniques of mostly civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as the use of social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and internet censorship.

Many demonstrations have met violent responses from authorities, as well as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators. These attacks have been answered with violence from protestors in some cases. A major slogan of the demonstrators in the Arab world has been *"Ash-shabyurīdisqāt an-nizām"* ("the people want to bring down the regime").

Jordan and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring in Jordan emerged in January 2011. Protests, demonstrations and public demands for change made their appearance in the major cities of the country and in southern area in what was called HIRAK (Arabic for "mobilization"). As in other countries, the main issues provoking unrest consisted of demands for both economic and political reforms. The protesters called for the means to combat high unemployment, the rise in taxes and the cost of living and of course, corruption.

The 2011 protest movement began not in the capital but in the southern town of Dhiban. Rural areas – unlike Amman – have experienced little development since the 1980's. Muhammad Sneid, a Jordanian protest leader, said:

"There's no fair distribution of revenue between rich and poor."

Youth Political and Social Engagement

There are very rich people, due to privatization.....There's no social justice, no fair distribution of development projects....The agricultural sector which was Jordan's most important sector and the basis of the economy in the rural areas, was destroyed by government policies. People are in debt due to increasing prices.”³

Motivations

The Arab spring can be attributed to many factors and reasons, including, but not limited to, issues like:

- Dictatorship.
- Human rights violation.
- Corruption.
- Economic decline.
- Unemployment.
- Poverty.
- Demographic structural factors, such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the population.
- The concentration of wealth in the hands of autocrats in power for decades; insufficient transparency of its redistribution and corruption.
- The refusal of the youth to accept the status quo.

Despite the extensive list of motivations for this civil unrest the core element found throughout is an inability for individuals, and especially youth, to be able to meaningfully participate in their economic and civil environment. In this manner the most important issue facing the government of Jordan today is facilitating youth participation through an effectively implemented policy.

³ International Crisis Group Report- Middle East/North Africa report Nr. 118-12 MARCH 2012

Youth Participation

Definition

The UN Programme on Youth defines youth participation as:

The active and meaningful involvement of young people in all aspects of their own, and their communities' development, including their empowerment to contribute to decisions about their personal, family, social, economic and political development.

Effective youth participation means that young people are not seen as passive recipients of national resources or the root causes of society's problems. Instead they are seen as stakeholders who make an important contribution to their countries' development and whose involvement must therefore be appropriately nurtured and cultivated.

Factors Inhibiting Youth Participation

To ensure proposed programmes effectively address the particular challenges and opportunities in each target community, the International Youth Foundation (IYF)⁴, in coop-

⁴ International Youth Foundation (IYF) is a U.S based organization established in 1990 to work on the development of youth and the past twenty years, IYF has mobilized 54 public and private sector donors to invest US\$163 million in the power and promise of young people. In all, 332 organizations in 86 countries have received grants from IYF aimed at increasing the scale, securing the sustainability, and improving the effectiveness of their youth-focused programs. As a result of these proven interventions, millions of young people are better poised to make healthy decisions, earn a livelihood, and become actively engaged members of their own communities.

Youth Political and Social Engagement

eration with the Jordanian Government, conducted in-depth surveys of young people and community members, as well as focus groups to gain further insight and knowledge about conditions and possible solutions. This “Rapid Community Assessment” (RCA) was conducted with the support of Mahara, a professional consultancy firm. The resulting RCA Report painted a more comprehensive picture of potential ways for youth to improve their employment opportunities.

The following were identified as barriers to youth employment:

- Negative attitude among youth that working in certain industries is not prestigious.
- Unrealistic expectations of good salaries and benefits.
- Lack of leadership and creativity amongst youth.
- A lack of consistency regarding time management, commitment, and productivity.

Additional Obstacles

Internal vs. External Control:

Justifying Civic Engagement

Without a belief that civic engagement will enhance socioeconomic statuses, Jordanian youth will continue to have little incentive to participate in any of the five levels of participation as outlined by the UN Programme on Youth. If youth feel victimized by fate and dependent upon external entities such as family or government for socioeconomic improvement, they will never engage with, nor increase participation in, civil society. Guiding youth through a process that positively influences their community will help young people understand their potential to change both their individual and community circumstances for the better.

Lack of Opportunities to Improve Circumstances: Youth Unemployment

Despite a vibrant educational environment, youth are often unable to find gainful employment. Consequently, the inability to provide for themselves only encourages further reliance on family and government, compounding and perpetuating the problem of youth unemployment: if youth have no opportunity to enhance their own economic well-being, they will be increasingly less inclined to participate in civic engagement or community improvement; if the system fails to provide a mechanism for self-improvement, a youth is more inclined to reject the system as a whole.

Lack of Effective Mentoring Relationships

As evidenced by recent protests and uprisings in the region, in large part led and facilitated by youth, it is evident that civil unrest has found a voice and means for its expression. The ability of youth to identify and have recourse to mentors would provide positive outlets for their frustration as well as guidance in how to alleviate those frustrations. Mentors provide the wisdom and knowledge necessary for a young person to meaningfully change his/her socioeconomic circumstances and make a positive contribution to society; in so doing, youth are endowed with feelings of empowerment and confidence. Though youth have found their voice, it is now necessary to help guide them to know what to say and how to say it.

Ownership and Investment in Communities: Volunteerism

A person or population's desire to participate at a local or national level depends upon a belief in one's active belonging to a given community and a sense of responsibility and stewardship arising out of investing one's time in it. To fa-

Youth Political and Social Engagement

Facilitate this sense of stewardship, a young person must be encouraged to invest in his or her own communities. Evidence produced by the RCA shows that providing youth with opportunities to volunteer their time and efforts in meaningful activities that positively impact their communities constitutes the most appropriate means of investment in community at both local and national levels. Such a course of action gives youth reason to believe that they are capable of and responsible for improving their community, while also encouraging a continuing role in efforts to enhance their communities.

Recommendations

Despite existing barriers, the RCA report found that young people exhibit a willingness and interest in taking advantage of employment-related opportunities, while exhibiting real enthusiasm as they become more positively engaged in their communities—if given a chance.

As part of the RCA's assessment, the following were proposed as recommendations for addressing root issues that lead to youth unemployment:

1. Employability (Life) Skills: NGOs should provide training to participants in life and employability skills, attitudes, and behaviour for work, as well as Business English.

2. Support Services: All participants should have access to such support services as career counseling, job searches, and coaching.

3. Internships/Apprenticeships:

Graduates of employment training programmes should be placed in internships or apprenticeships with local firms.

4. Entrepreneurship Training: For those who wish to start their own businesses, the following steps, taken together and sequentially, have proved to have positive impacts, namely; developing a business plan, acquiring small loans for working

capital and equipment, and collaborating with business and trade associations that can offer adult mentors or coaches to support and advise young entrepreneurs.

5. Integrate Life Skills and Professional Skills Development into Training Programmes: RCA results point to a multitude of challenges regarding young people's self-perception, confidence and their general preparedness for the workforce. This often results in lack of motivation to seek jobs and to integrate successfully in the work environment if lucky enough to find a job. To address this core challenge, innovative approaches to teaching life-skills to youth and providing community service opportunities for youth to practice what they have learned should be considered.

6. Make Civic Engagement a More Visible and Accessible Option: RCA findings indicate that the level of civic engagement and volunteerism by young people in target communities is strikingly low. Partners in designing community programmes must ensure such programmes are more accessible, more effective and are able to scale up their services. To ensure programmes are "demand driven" and appealing to youth, programme design should include consultations and focus groups with young people to identify the types of activities young people would like to join in each neighborhood.

7. Use Civic Engagement and Volunteerism to Build Skills: Lastly, the RCA recommends that young people be equipped with skills both to improve their communities and their own long term livelihoods, resulting in a feeling of empowerment among youth populations. Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community- Based Organizations (CBOs) should seek ways to make activities that build these capacities safe, fun, and entertaining while rewarding participants with a sense of accomplishment for themselves and their communities. In this regard, CNGOs and CBOs should

Youth Political and Social Engagement

integrate training programmes into community service initiatives as part of “service learning” approaches. In this model, new skills acquired can be practiced and honed through the design, budgeting, implementation, management and evaluation of volunteer-based activities that have a direct and positive impact on local surroundings (e.g, renovating a new public park or creating a local outdoor theatre).

Existing Youth Policy: The Higher Council for Youth

The gap between talk of reform and its non-implementation led a former royal advisor to conclude: “*In Jordan, public relations is a substitute for policy*”⁵.

Currently there are a number of programmes, in both the public and private sectors, attempting to address the lack of youth participation by overcoming the previously explained barriers. Some of these programmes include: the Jordan River Foundation, the Queen Rania Center For Entrepreneurship, and the UNDP-Jordan’s Programme for Youth Employment Generation in Mafrq, Ma’an and Madaba.

The Jordanian Higher Council for Youth (HCY) exists as one such governmental programme with a strong record of success. The first of its kind in the Arab World, the HCY arose as the primary vehicle through which Jordan could effectuate positive change within its youth population under the National Youth Strategy⁶ articulated in 2004.

⁵ International Crisis Group-Middle East/ North Africa Report No.118, *popular protest in north Africa and the middle east (IX): dallying with reform in a divided Jordan*, 12 March 2012.

⁶ National Youth Strategy for Jordan 2005- 2009

Designed in consultation with “nearly 50000 Jordanian Youth” the study established the Higher Council for Youth to promote the following goals and objectives as crucial for young Jordanians⁷:

- The upbringing of a youth adhering to his/her faith, belonging to his/her country and his/her nation, aware of the nation’s cultural heritage and values, responsible and capable of strengthening the democratic approach, intellectual pluralism, respectful of human rights and capable of dealing with the requirements of the modern age and technology.
- Entrenching the youth’s patriotism to homeland and loyalty to the Hashemite leadership, respect for the constitution, the sovereignty of law and the principles of the Great Arab Revolution.
- Regulating the youth’s capabilities and investing them in a manner that best achieves their active participation in sustainable human development, and entrenching the values of teamwork and volunteerism.
- Encouraging the youth to exercise leisure sports for the purpose of developing physical fitness and self-control.

Despite the merits of these objectives, they are not geared specifically toward youth participation as an end result, and the specific means of facilitating participation is not clear. It is necessary to provide an applied aspect of policy that would use a more direct means of facilitating youth participation along with the generalized statements found here. The dearth

⁷http://images.jordan.gov.jo/wps/wcm/connect/gov/eGov/Government+Ministries+_+Entities/Higher+Council+for+Youth/General+Information/

Youth Political and Social Engagement

of civic engagement and the rampant youth unemployment plaguing Jordan is material in nature and as such can only be combatted through applied policy. In order to improve the HCY's efficacy and effectiveness, it should incorporate RCA's suggestions for stimulating youth employment and civic engagement: For example, HCY would better serve youth if it makes the instruction, development, and cultivation of employability (life) skills within youth populations its primary goal. Additionally, the HCY should enhance its current support services while inaugurating programmes designed to give youth real, applied work experience via the provision of internships and apprenticeships, entrepreneurship training, while integrating life and professional skills development into its training programs. Moreover, HCY should consult with community partners, institutions, and organizations within the public and private sectors, developing programs and work-placement opportunities designed to utilize civic engagement and volunteerism as means to enhance youth capacities and capabilities.

Application of Policy: The IVY Program

As has been stated before policy without a direct strategy for implementation, policy remains theoretical and fails to translate into substantial change. To illustrate what this implementation strategy might comprise the following programme has been included in this brief.

Implementing the following programme as a means of applying the existing policy of the Higher Council for Youth in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation would increase the prospects for youth involvement, and create solutions to the economic and social prob-

lems they face.

Building upon the information and suggestions of the Rapid Community Assessment engaged in by the Jordanian Government and the IYF, the Initiative for the Volunteerism of Youth (IVY Programme) was designed by Zaytoon International and implemented on a pilot basis during the summer of 2011. Engaging this programme as a cooperative effort between the Higher Council of Youth and non-governmental organizations would provide a substantial means of increasing the economic and civic engagement of youth in targeted communities.

The IVY Program was created through a cooperative effort with various Jordanian partners to help participants learn problem solving and management skills through volunteerism. Over the course of the programme, students identify a problem in the community, propose a solution to that problem, and implement that solution through a community service project. Students use skills that they learn in collaboration with those implementing the IVY programme in order to plan the project, identify and obtain the materials needed to complete the project, and lead others in making their project a success. The following are characteristics of the programme that make it a success:

- Lessons are “Caught” not “Taught”: Emphasis on learning by doing as teachers help the students see the various principles they are learning as they work through their projects.
- Teach Individuals not Lessons: Teachers understand that each youth has different strengths and weaknesses. As a result students of the IVY programme receive a high amount of one on one interaction from their teachers to maximize strengths and overcome weaknesses.
- Lifelong Mentoring: IVY students have the opportunity to engage local business and civic leaders that have partnered with the IVY programme to mentor students during and af-

Youth Political and Social Engagement

ter their involvement in the programme. Students are not only encouraged to seek out mentors but also to help mentor others contributing to positive and organic change.

- Believe in Abilities and Expect Results: Community projects are planned and implemented by the students (not teachers) making them responsible for the success (or failure) of their programmes. This is often the first time students have been put in charge which motivates hard work and empowers them in positively impacting the world around them.

In addition to project management training, participants in the programme have the opportunity to participate in English Classes, which are taught by the IVY programme. Together, participants in the program gain valuable skills that will give them an advantage in the workplace.

Objectives:

- Build a youth's entrepreneurial capacity to problem solve, to set goals, to gather resources, and to manage the execution of a plan.
- Increase volunteerism among youth
- Increase participation in volunteerism among members of the community
- Build up Jordanian communities

Steps of Approach:

- Youth and Stakeholder Involvement in Preliminary Needs Assessment
- Adjustment of Curriculum
- Individual Mentoring and Instruction
- Community Project Development and Implementation
- Continued Evaluation of Programme (Adjust Accordingly)
- Youth Mentor Others

Achievements of the IVY Program Pilot:

As the IVY Programme was only implemented in one community on a pilot basis the results of the program are not generalizable and as such more evaluation and adjustment is required before widespread implementation of the programme. Despite this being the case, it is worthwhile mentioning the achievements of the IVY Pilot Program:

1. Over forty students attended the IVY Project's lecture series. The lecture series included instruction in English, problem solving, goal setting, budgeting, and leadership empowerment.

2. In one month the IVY students identified, planned, and directed the execution of five community projects that totalled over 300 hours of community service labour hours. The projects were as follows:

- The community non-smoking campaign
- The community park reconstruction project (Students directed the construction of park walls and the installation of five park benches)
- The Green community project (Students planted 20 trees in the local park)
- The community centre improvement project (Students directed the retiling of the front of the community centre, and the cleaning of its raised garden beds)
- The community clean park project (Students directed the picking up of rubbish in the local park)

3. IVY students were able to gather material donations that were worth over 1100 JD and IVY students involved over 250 members of the local community in their projects.

Youth Political and Social Engagement

Conclusion

Facilitating youth participation in developing their civic and economic capacities via effectively implemented policy constitutes one of the most important issues facing the government of Jordan today. The Higher Council for Youth has been organized to address problems facing youth but is not focused on this problem of youth participation. The objectives and focus of the Higher Council for Youth must be changed to focus on this problem of youth participation and applications. In order to improve the HCY's efficacy and effectiveness, it should incorporate RCA's suggestions for stimulating youth employment and civic engagement.

In addition to adjusting the core objectives of the Higher Council for Youth, it is necessary to provide an applied aspect of policy that would use a more direct means of facilitating youth participation. Lack of civic engagement and youth unemployment in Jordan are material issues and as such can only be combated through material means. Implementing a programme such as the one described in this brief provides a material application of policy toward youth involvement. A change in focus within the Higher Council for Youth combined with a collaborative approach that draws on the successful experience of the IVY Programme would increase youth involvement, creating solutions to economic and social problems they face. Thus prepared, these youth will be able to effectively lead Jordan through these uncertain times and into a bright future.




Chapter Three

Education Policy



To Adopt regionalization is to adapt Education

by Meriem EL HILALI



This policy brief examines how far the trend towards increased disparities in education extends to Moroccan regions. It follows on from the advanced regionalization plan for which the Kingdom has opted since 2010 and the series of education reforms about to be put in place to boost regional development through a customized educational system in each one

Education Policy

of the 12 regions and their respective schools and universities.

An assessment of the progress made to date is both timely and important as we are now mid-way between the announcement of the regionalization plan by HM the King on January 3, 2010, and the upcoming implementation of regionalization measures in different policy spheres including education.

The government has in recent years undertaken several reforms to improve access to higher education and reduce regional differences in the provision of education. The King announced the period from 1999 to 2009 as the “Education Decade”, during which reform initiatives focused on five main themes to expand the role of knowledge in economic development. The key themes were education, governance, private sector development, e-commerce and access. With the help of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies Morocco has also succeeded in improving the basic education system.

While increased public expenditure on education and reform efforts have taken place in many big Moroccan cities and universities, secondary and higher education systems are generating growing inequalities in access and do not respond to the specific needs of each region. Demand for higher education is rising as people are becoming more aware of its importance for their socioeconomic development, but the poor quality of services and insufficiency of the perceived benefits of schooling remains challenging to Morocco as a whole.

This brief proposes recommendations on how to improve higher education with the aim of to promoting respect for human rights, social cohesion and economic competitiveness across the regions. We will look at how the regions can match their educational provision to local needs. Overall, there is a need to raise awareness among local government officials and stakeholders of the importance of ensuring a high quality of

education for all if individual, social and economic development objectives are to be met. It is hoped that this policy brief will contribute towards this effort.¹

Background of the problem

In Morocco, the regional dimension is an integral part of new public policies of the state. These policies aim to strengthen the backbone of regional economies through the encouragement of entrepreneurship and innovation in the region with one main goal: to build a resilient set of regions, which are competitive and strong enough to attract direct and indirect investments towards improving their level of development. Therefore, education in general and secondary and higher education more specifically remain the major issues in ensuring the success of this vision. For this reason, the direction of education, scientific research and vocational training towards objectives with a regional dimension is worth investigating.

No educational institution or its scientific staff can ignore the importance of development within the dynamics of the territory in which they are situated. Thus, the question of how customized education and scientific research can contribute to regional development require adequate answers to the new demands arising from regional consciousness.

The Moroccan education system consists of 6 years of primary education, 3 years of middle school, 3 years of higher secondary education, and for those who choose to continue, tertiary education. The higher education system in Morocco is

¹ This policy brief is based on stakeholder interviews with professors and students in regional institutions, local academies in Rabat, Kenitra, Meknes and Agadir, and the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture; and an online survey amongst 300 students from 12 regions

under the auspices of the Ministry of Higher Education and Executive Training. The Ministry of National Education decentralized its functions to regional levels in 1999 when 72 provinces were subsumed into 16 regional administrative units. Since then the responsibility for providing educational services has been slowly devolving to the regional level. This decentralization process had as a key objective to ensure that educational programmes respond to regional needs and the budget is administered locally accordingly. Each region has now a Regional Academy for Education and Training. These academies were initially created only to manage exams regionally, but regional exams are now prepared and managed by the regional academy and its delegations. This has proved to be a positive step.

The academy also plays an important role in the continuing training of personnel engaged in the field of education. Morocco now has regional centres for educational training and associated occupations which professors and administration staff attend to upgrade their professional competencies based on the latest methods used in the world of education.

A problem arises, however, in matching the training provided to what is needed in each region, especially in the absence of forward planning for future needs, including training for specific pedagogical and administrative purposes.

As regards curriculum development, the regional academies were to be responsible for developing 30% of the content to ensure that it was locally relevant. The Ministry of Education at the national level continues to manage the other 70%. Also the delegations are in charge of providing services for education in their region.

In article 58 of the commission's report on advanced regionalization it is stated that: *"In partnership with the University, the Regional Council will encourage the development of scientific and technological research, the opening of the university on its regional environment, the immense cultural development of the region and will promote society of knowledge and learning."*

There is however an inadequate understanding of a region's educational needs and aspirations, as well as the readiness and ability of individual regions to serve as an active agent in developing educational policy. There is also a low level of implementing the social and adaptive functions of education given that many of those directly involved lack an adequate understanding of the cultural aims and values of education policy. Recommendations in this policy brief will propose a number of approaches towards redressing these deficits, as well as enhancing the process of regionalizing education in Morocco as a tool to strengthen local governance and shift cultural mind sets.

The Role of local government in education

In other countries such as the U.S.A and Brazil, local governments play a key role in public education from kindergarten to community college level. Local government, along with states, provide the primary funding for public schools, using money largely raised through state and local taxes. Local governments at all levels are involved in education policy, including at county, city, town and district levels. Their task is to make critical decisions about funding and pedagogy, while serving as a channel between local communities and state education departments.

In Morocco it is very important that the Ministry of Education works on delegating power to local entities to meet local priorities while preserving national prerogatives and the Moroccan identity. The advanced regionalization plan will not be able to meet its goals unless education is used both as a tool for developing good practice in local governance and for regional elites to be able to represent their communities and boost research that serves local needs in terms of entrepreneurship and sustainable development for the region which

Education Policy

reflects its competitive advantages.

Improving education at the regional level, with appropriate regional assistance, would help the emergence of these elites from their home communities and encourage them to invest their know-how in developing their regions socially and economically instead of moving to big economic poles like Casablanca and Rabat as they tend to do now.

In his speech on advanced regionalization, HM King Mohammed 6th stated: *"In fact, we do not want the regions of Morocco to be purely formal and bureaucratic, but rather to be representative bodies of qualified elites that are able to manage the affairs of their respective regions the best they can"*.

This elite would not emerge unless local educational needs are met in ways that follow the same national quality standards and equity between the regions.

Various organizations and companies promote the participation of regional government in education nowadays in Morocco. Local administrations should also provide an opportunity for the direct involvement of parents and community members in school policy. Unlike the authorities in Rabat and in the Ministry of Education, local officials are better placed to know details that are important in local decision-making and should be able to make decisions on a broad range of issues such as what dialects or local languages (such as Berber, or AMAZIGHIYA) to offer depending on linguistic characteristics of the population. They also have better knowledge of the type of entrepreneurship courses to offer; where to locate a new school to serve far away residents; the nature of local health or traffic issues; and most importantly the role of a school in community life, through providing concrete projects in which students can get involved locally, for example.

Presently, the Ministries of Education and Higher Education in Morocco still centralize a large majority of these policy- and decision-making processes.

Policy proposals

The potential advantages of regionalisation

Regions must be able to provide customized educational content to the local population. This need not necessarily mean that school must be completely regionalized, only that the region should be able to organize and adapt teaching to the needs of the local population in terms of their cultural needs. However, the funding for this should remain in the hands of the Moroccan community as a whole, based on the annual education budget allocated by the financial law annually, leaving a percentage to the region and the regional academy to generate via their own services and taxes. In the case of the northern and southern regions of Morocco, they differ sociologically – and that goes for many other Moroccan regions. There are specific demographic tendencies in terms of forecasts, or in the increase of the school age population in some areas or the number of immigrants from the countryside arriving in urban districts. The current organization of education policy prevents any coherence emerging between education and other policies which are complementary in the field of youth, sports, employment, housing, mobility and so on.

The regionalization of education would necessarily touch on the field of culture, in the promotion of the AMAZIGH language and culture officially recognised in the constitutional revisions adopted in 2011. In the case of Morocco's southern territories, the HASSANI dialect, culture and history are also regionally specific.

What is needed is a mechanism that better reflects the realities on the ground, according to rates of immigration, urban density and so on, for which funding on a regional basis would be more appropriate.

This policy option would regionalize education but

keep strong synergies between the regions in order to keep consistency in terms of schedules, status, labour force mobility, and so on. These synergies should be ensured by an interregional coordination structure.

This synergy would allow comparisons between regions and reasonable assessment of each one. Ensuring accountability via local voters is essential, and unless education is managed by regional representatives, the voters cannot hold them accountable directly.

Focussing on what is needed

A region must have the ability to focus its educational policies on regional labour market needs, such as fishing in coastal regions, mining, agriculture, tourism, industry or services in others. Here we may mention the example of EL GHARB under the regional academy of Kenitra where they ought to focus on technical options dedicated to agriculture whereas it should rather be mining in Khribga region in collaboration with OCP, the biggest business operator in the region for phosphates. In AL Gharb region, it would be options dedicated to the extraction and refining of beet for instance opting for Cosumar a big business in this field installed in the region, to finance and provide real research and working opportunities for students during and after their studies.

The idea would be to regionalize education according to the needs of the local business community and future demands. Also, in the same way that one region might need to concentrate on developing skills for competitiveness, in another region it might be language skills for service industries such as tourism which might be more important. There are strong needs for the development of technical skills in some regions like Khouribga, as a region dedicated to phosphate exploitation, but they are insufficiently met because educational provision is insufficiently specialised. Economic and education competencies need to be addressed in parallel and

driven by the needs of each region's existing workforce and anticipated needs. If the region's economy is based on tourism, there should be a high focus on service education and tertiary skills in specific entrepreneurship classes with a range of available foreign languages to learn. This does not mean that the purpose of education would be limited to meeting the needs of enterprises, but would complement the formation of cultivated and well- rounded citizens.

Policy recommendations

According to the policy proposals outlined above the important attributes of each could be merged into one overarching slogan: *Social and economic factors matter for adaptation*. Therefore, social and economic factors should be explicitly addressed in adapting policies for education. In the same way that social factors, such as promoting the local language in teaching, should be addressed, so should linking education to the needs of local business needs and demands be a priority. Throughout their educational careers, students - especially at the high school and college level - should be encouraged to get involved in community projects funded both by the region and the central government in order to link local research proposals, for example, to real local issues and needs.

Secondly, elaborating national standards as a basis of an overall national policy needs to combine features common to all with features specific to individual regions. National standards should be capable of being adapted and applied to the specific needs of the respective regions. In turn, regional governments need to produce regional policies within the framework of national standards. Follow-up mechanisms for policy implementation and evaluation should be elaborated with measurable indicators in mind. Regions should also be given the opportunity to engage in a process of self-evaluation be-

fore external evaluation takes place.

To safeguard this partial independence in the management of educational policy at the regional level, in addition to the funding provided from central government, regional academies need to generate other sources of revenue. In this respect, they might raise income from establishing private schools and provide venues for summer programmes, for example, or work with private businesses to provide professional training at their own expense at state schools and universities. Wealthier students might also be expected to pay tuition and campus fees instead of receiving their university education for free as now. All this would fall under each educational establishment's projects for education and the revenues generated would benefit the educational institution providing the service contribute to improving the educational quality for all students as well as providing better working conditions for educational staff.

Last but not least, through adapting education to local regional needs, the measures to improve the regionalization of education proposed here would reinforce people's awareness of self-governance and locally-driven approaches to sustainable development where engaging local communities and citizens would be at the heart of the reform process.

Local awareness-raising could be channelled through media and educational programmes to inform local communities about the objectives of regionalization in schools, mosques, written and visual media and through the involvement of local civil society organizations.

The decentralization of educational policy started some time ago in Morocco with the creation of regional academies in 1987. Now with the plan of advanced regionalization, it could provide one of the best motors for achieving the goals of self-governance and the involvement of local stakeholders in decision making processes.

Soci
e

Chapter Four
Good Governance
and Civil Society



Civil Society Reforms And Integration: A Key To Democratic Governance In Algeria

by Nadia Logab

Introduction

In the context of the recent wave of uprisings and revolts that several countries in the MENA region have experienced, civil society has become a key player in shaping a country's present and sculpting its future. Reforms of civil society have become more than ever indispensable in order to cope with civil unrest and prevent social anger developing into violence and even political destabilization.

As a first step, the recent political reforms in Algeria included a new law relative¹ to associations that controls associational work and assures it does not pose a threat to national sovereignty. However, the Algerian law neither empowers civil society as a vital partner to the government in the decision-making process, nor does it guarantee the effectiveness of active associations through measures of control and regulation.

More reforms are needed to insure civil society organizations (CSOs) in Algeria are structured in a way to serve as a bridge to link individuals to civil society and the latter to the ruling institutions. When achieved, reformed CSOs would be the voice through which the majority of citizens could in-

¹ Law N° 12-06 of January 2012 relative to associations.

Good Governance and Civil Society

fluence the government. Individuals will also have a greater sense that political actions and measures reflect their own needs and concerns.

The current policy brief will summarise the current situation of civil society in Algeria and set out some recommendations for CSO reform developed by the author in consultation with national experts and academics as well as representatives of key CSOs in Algeria. The main recommendations also take into consideration the academic and field research on the subject undertaken by the author.

These recommendations are to be presented to the Economic and Social National Council of Algeria which is tasked by the President to prepare a set of good governance recommendations that are going to be addressed to the government for immediate implementation in late January 2013

The main reforms recommended include:

- Organizational reforms to assure the effectiveness of CSOs in Algeria. This includes, but is not limited to, the creation of a CSO authority, as a body that will supervise and organize CSOs, assure training, check their work plans and financial status, and exercise sanctions according to a chart of ethics devoted to CSOs

- Legal reforms to secure financial and operational transparency. CSOs should publish annual reports with their financial status, achieved plans, future projects, in order to ensure accountability and trust. New laws should include the possibility of structuring qualified CSOs as professional NGOs which will allow for more productivity and sustainability, unlike the current situation where CSOs rely mainly on voluntary work.

- Other legal reforms should emphasize the need to diver-

sify the funding basis of CSOs, so that when the government gives public money to CSOs there should be a requirement for co-financing from other sources. This is because it is usually funding problems that bring about the manipulation of CSOs. Therefore a new text should oblige CSOs to be regulated by the rules of public legal tenders and specifications when seeking and spending money.

- Operational and technological reforms are needed to create online platform where CSOs are to be registered. This platform would enable ordinary citizens to gain access to a diversity of financial and operational information about the registered CSO and communicate with it. The registered CSO will have to display its annual report on the platform as well for the public.

Background To The Problem

Historically speaking, Algerians have known the concept of civil society since the early 1930s when religious, social, and political associations were created in order to advocate human rights and build the Algerian independence movement against the French colonizers. However, given the fact that the country experienced a single party policy since its independence in 1962 up until the democratic opening to a multiparty constitution in 1989, Algerian civil society organizations were strongly politicized. They were required to be completely pro-government and promote the ideology and ideas of the single party FLN², should they want to continue to exist under its ad-

²the Front de Libération Nationale, Algeria's unique political party till 1989

Good Governance and Civil Society

ministration. Therefore, the Algerian experience with a free and diversified civil society is relatively new and undeveloped. Yet, according to experts, the country counted more than 83000 accredited civil society associations in 2008. The growing number of civil society organizations (CSOs) in Algeria, however, did not participate much in improving individuals' welfare, nor did they accurately represent society's concerns to the government. Rather, the majority of CSOs have been seen by the media and the majority of citizens as another façade of the government, whose main role has been to applaud official policies and collect votes and support for their sponsors. Thus, CSOs in Algeria have not been considered effective³ in terms of linking the citizens to their government and holding the government to account, which should be one of their roles in achieving democratic governance, according to academics.⁴

Accordingly, reforms of civil society are a timely priority to all of those who are concerned with the near future of the country. CSOs should be filtered, assessed, and restructured,

³ This was proven during the inventory of civil society organization that was driven after a series of meetings between the Economic and Social National Council of Algeria and CSOs all over the country during 2011. Also, the debate that was held between civil society experts and representative and the Algerian YAANI team concluded that ineffectiveness of CSOs in Algeria, see attached workshop document. Moreover, a questionnaire was launched to ask senior university students majoring in political science where more than 92% of the 323 students evaluated CSOs in Algeria as to be in a bad shape.

⁴ See Claire Spencer 'The Changing role of Civil Society in the Euro-Mediterranean Area' http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20East/cspencer_chapter.pdf

since it is crucial to hold everyone responsible for their promises and actions and to organize their associations better to achieve their objectives.

What reforms and mechanisms should be implemented to ensure CSOs are structured to represent the broader interests and concerns of society? And which stakeholders should be involved with the process?

Diagnosis Of The Current Situation

In the light of the Arab spring, Algeria's recent judicial reforms reflected the government's concern about a possible foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country through the medium of international organizations acting as a partner or a part of the Algerian civil society. Therefore, the new law adopted on 12 January 2012 relative to associations prioritized the necessity of vigilance and national loyalty when dealing with foreign associations and/or seeking funding partnerships with foreign sources. The law also stated that the founding of religious associations should comply with a particular judicial framework, and stressed the prohibition of discriminatory acts in addition to basic structural and organizational procedures. However, nothing was added in terms of improving the quality of the projects proposed by civic associations or their effectiveness in relation to Algerian civil society. In other words, Algerian law does not yet consider CSOs to be a decisive partner in the parliamentary process or in relation to other governmental institutions.

The connection between the government and CSOs in Algeria is currently reduced to occasional seminars and consultations that are essential but never sufficient; the National

Good Governance and Civil Society

Economic and Social Council represents the official body that among other things conveys CSOs recommendations to the government, and assesses and recommends public policies to the government. In contrast, the linkage between CSOs and individual Algerian citizens is mostly on a voluntary basis and unstructured. There is also an historically-rooted problem of trust and reliability that continues to threaten the credibility of CSOs in Algeria. With few exceptions, the most prominent CSOs in the country, such as trade unions, became major supporters of the most powerful political parties and the government through their obvious engagement in electoral campaigns and political propaganda. In doing so, they have been preserving their political interests and many CSOs have recently transformed themselves into political parties and their members have stood for executive and political positions. There is also a money-related incentive for doing so, since it is often the state that funds CSOs. Consequently, most CSOs are rarely independent in their activities and programmes and serve in one way or another specific political agendas. It is also worth mentioning that there is no experience of the professionalization of CSOs in Algeria, which for the most part are based on voluntary work of their members. The officials of CSOs are not legally entitled to receive a remuneration for their work with a given CSO which leads some to seek corrupt ways to gain money, or forces them to give up if funding is an issue, thus prejudicing the continuity of their work and destabilizing ongoing projects. Working for CSOs is not a full-time occupation, which undermines the viability and credibility of many civic organisations.

Policy Options

After a debate and discussion with different stakeholders, including civil society representatives, journalists, students, parliamentarians, lawyers, professors and experts in civil society, along with research on relative publications and documents, the author has drawn up the following options as concrete mechanisms and tools with which to empower and reform CSOs in Algeria:

1: Create A Regulatory Authority For Civil Society In Algeria

Algeria has no independent regulatory authority for the CSO sector, yet models exist elsewhere that could be drawn on to adapt to the specific circumstances of Algeria. This authority⁵ would be responsible for the functioning of all legally registered CSOs, including charitable and voluntary organizations. It is the body that accords a licence for such organizations and oversees their work and adherence to codes of practice applicable to the sector. It should be an independent body, financed by the state but with sufficient prerogatives to exercise its mandate. The authority would oversee the statutes of CSOs and approve the financial status and overall objectives and functioning of each organisation, as well as its accountability. The authority would also provide to relevant CSO staff and members, and provide required assistance and expertise when required.

⁵ This can be inspired from the Office of Civil Society in England, for instance.

Good Governance and Civil Society

2: Strengthen The Relationship Between Civil Society And The Government

Algeria lacks an appropriate legal framework to define the relationship between CSOs and the legislative power, and new legislative texts are needed to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of each, above all to promote and protect the representation of CSO concerns and interests in debates and discussions within the parliamentary discussions, with a view to providing their opinions and recommendations on legislation under consideration. A supplementary recommendation is for CSOs to work closely with the specialized parliamentary commissions. This also includes institutionalizing the relationship between the two parties, as in Tunisia and Morocco where a ministerial office governing the relationship between parliament and civil society already exist.

3: Conduct An Urgent Assessment Of Civil Society In Algeria

It is highly desirable that all CSOs in Algeria submit to a process that allows for a critical -assessment of their strengths and weaknesses through peer review and participatory civil society evaluation. These are mechanisms that have been used throughout the world and the African continent in order to ensure transparency and quality of the functioning of CSOs and their projects. This will allow CSOs in Algeria to evaluate each other and learn from shared experiences, but also will ensure competitiveness between them. It will result in more transparent organizations and restore the trust of the public in CSOs and then increase public participation in civil society. It is also a medium of networking that will lead CSOs of the same interest and objectives to construct stronger lobbies and thereby gain more weight

3: Create An Online Interactive Platform

The authority of civil society should run a virtual platform through which all CSOs should register and acquire special accounts where they can publish their annual reports, financial status, and share their successes and challenges and report on the development of their projects and activities. They can interact with other CSOs and pertinent governmental institutions such as the National Economic and Social Council. The platform will include a review tool that permits the registered CSOs to evaluate and receive evaluation from their peers. It should then contain an accurate directory of all registered CSOs with contact information of their representatives.

The platform should be managed by a highly talented management team that gathers experts in ICT, marketing and communication, finance, civil society, report analysis. The management team should be hired through a competitive selection process, whereas the president of the authority should be designated by the president of the republic. One main task of the moderation team is to ensure certain guidelines and ethics are fully respected when conducting the peer reviews by the platform users and also when contributing to the platform publications. The editing and report analysis team should work on a periodic report that informs on the activity progress of all registered CSOs and also deliver an inclusive CSOs assessment report on the basis of the peer review mechanism.

The platform will serve as a space to individuals to know about CSOs in their towns and allow registered CSOs to attract more participation. It will also allow individuals to communicate to CSOs through a special online forum. Offline discussions should be organized periodically to communicate the progress reports and open debates for the public. An award should be dedicated for the best CSOs of the year with the participation and sponsoring of the private sector.

Good Governance and Civil Society

The platform will include a financial management space where all registered CSOs have to provide detailed reports on their budget management. This financial system will be supervised by the experts of finance of the management team that will report on any incidents and unjustified expenses.

4: Create NGOs

NGOs are non-profit organizations which are independent from any governmental form. They are structured mainly like a business/profit organization with a reliable management system. The benefit of NGO is that they are easy to hold accountable and to be supervised since they are subject to financial and organizational audits (unlike other kinds of CSOs). They also are run by permanent staff dedicated to the work and the mission of the NGO. Unlike the voluntary based associations that exist in Algeria, NGOs are more sustainable since the staff are remunerated and motivated and also they have clear procedures in place to run the organization. The flip-side of these advantages is that they need more funding to pay for fixed costs and investments. However, when compared to the costs of not having an effective and reliable CSOs in Algeria, these costs are worth bearing.

5: Regulate Funding


The funding sources of CSOs including NGOs should be regulated by an instruction from the authority of civil society. Fundings should be sought from both private and public sectors. This gives more independence to the CSO and ensures public credibility and trust. Funding should obey to public bids and specifications. This diversifies funding sources, avoids one funding source manipulation, and increases transparency and trust in CSOs projects.

Conclusion

In Algeria, more than 2000 protests take place each year that reflect civic anger and discontent. In most of these cases, civil society neither runs the protests, nor does it speak on behalf of the individuals about how to mitigate such anger or improve the situation. These protests are extremely costly to government resources, and a lot of money is spent on reconstruction and cleaning after protests, let alone in the policing of civic disruption. Moreover, the lack of organisation and effectiveness of CSOs in Algeria is causing a widening gap between individual citizens and the government. Governmental actions are not representative of people's needs and concerns, while people do not trust the government. The reform of the CSO sector in Algeria would be of great benefit to the government and the public alike. The engagement of more citizens in CSOs, above all those involved in discussing and debating public policies and decisions taken by the government, would serve to channel much of the anger now expressed on the streets into more constructive channels, that would also serve as a bridge between citizens and the government. Citizens would be able to voice their concerns in more structured and representative ways at governmental institutions and thus have an influence over laws and policies that affect them. In turn, government policies and actions would better reflect what people involved in constructive civil society activities want. This will only happen if a culture of structured and effective CSOs is encouraged in Algeria. The recommendations outlined above are practical steps to begin this process in order to ensure quality, organization, and accountability of Algerian civil society.

References

- Andrea Liverani. August 2008. Civil Society in Algeria, the Political Functions of Associational Life.
- Abd Nacer Djabi, Novembre 2006. Etude Relations entre le parlement et la société civile en Algérie.
- Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne N°2, 15 January 2012
- Questionnaire, run by YAANI member Abdel Ilah Bellaoui.



Chapter Five

Media and Social Networks



The Press in Morocco: Between Requirements and Reality

by Zakia Bellefqih

Introduction

Considered as the 4th power, the media are not only a leading actor in securing democracy but also a key partner in the transmission of information to the citizens and their adhesion to public policies.

Like everywhere else, the wind of the «Arab Spring» is blowing through Morocco. Since the outbreak of successive revolutions in our neighboring countries, showing results and change has become increasingly important among decision makers in Morocco. In this context, the freedom of the media (and more particularly that of the press) in Morocco has become a highly-visible and discussed issue. The condition of the media in Morocco provokes and demands discussion, reform, responsibility and freedom.

The Moroccan citizen has great expectations from the new era and from the press. He aspires to live within a nation in which democracy is deeply anchored, and within a community where access to information is a constitutionally guaranteed right.¹

The new Constitution of 2011 dedicated a number of articles to the citizens' freedoms², and access to information. Still,

¹ A new constitution was voted in July 2011.

² 22 articles are dedicated to freedom and 3 articles to the freedom of expressions (articles 25, 27, 28)

Media and Social Networks

the reality speaks for itself. In a country with laws stating that it is the citizen's right to freely speak and accede to information, journalists are still being arrested and put in jail for violation of the press code.

In the present Moroccan context, the reforms and the laws penalizing the freedom of expression must be amended in order for them to be consistent with the new constitution, for nothing should oppose the freedom of expression and the right to information.

From this problem originate the following questions:

- 1. What are the problem areas and dysfunctions of the Moroccan press?*
- 2. Which elements of the present policies are actually in place; and which elements can be seen either as encouraging/discouraging or problematic, and in what ways can they be seen as antithetical to the new constitution?*
- 3. In the light of the aforementioned elements, what are the recommendations which can be favored in order to promote freedom of the press?*

Twilight zones of the press

Nobody can speak about the press in Morocco without recalling the evolution which this latter has undergone since the country's independence. Year after year, the press has witnessed some evolutions in terms of new publications and releases. However, as in the rest of the world, the press faces some limits, dysfunctions and also some phases of crisis. A SWOT analysis can help us to understand the situation.



Strengths:

- A diversity of supply and a considerable presence of independent press. The Moroccan kiosk is diversified with a panoply of publications in Arabic, Amazigh and French.
- The existence of a framework convention³ which aims at modernizing the sector; it also serves as a basis for the organization of the information economy and more specifically for the press.
- A strong growth of advertising in the press market
- The broadening of the Moroccan kiosk and its passage from a partisan to an independent press. This broadening process marks the end of an era when the political actor was monopolizing the press market. Also the onset of independent press can be assimilated to the emergence of a 4th power.

³ Signature of the convention between the Ministry of Communication and the Sector's stakeholder, namely the SNPM [= Le SYNDICAT NATIONAL DE LA PRESSE MAROCAINE (THE NATIONAL MOROCCAN PRESS UNION)] and the FMJE [La Federation Marocaine des Journalistes et Editeurs (The Moroccan Federation of Journalists AND Publishers)]

Media and Social Networks

Weaknesses:

- An insufficiency of the legal framework and its inability to accompany the evolution of the press and new technologies.
- The inexistence of an ethics code or deontological authority.
- The press sector enterprises are small size and fragile.
- The low sales, correlated to a reduced readership, lead to the fact that the press does not bring about enough revenues for the press to survive. Furthermore some publications are totally dependent on advertising revenues.
- The press in Morocco is part of the Arab countries in which readership rate is among the lowest in the world.⁴
- The press with economic content addresses itself to the elite and is published only in French.
- According to the latest estimations, the illiteracy rate is around 30%.⁵

Threats:

- The rapid expansion of bloggers and the electronic press
- The rise of new business rivals of the press like alternative media which focus their information on social networks.
- The relation between the advertisers and the media is not regulated by the law, which constitutes a considerable threat for the latter. This means that advertisers can very easily boycott a publication and financially suffocate it.
- The pressure exercised by some advertisers on some

⁴ 15 copies per 1000 inhabitants, compared to France (167 inhabitants) and the UK (322)

⁵ A figure made public by the Direction de Lutte Contre l'Analphabétisme [= DLCA (the Directorate for the Fight Against Illiteracy)]

-
- publications' contents and editorial lines.
- The marketing of some highly sophisticated tablets and mobiles.
 - The free press boom.

Opportunities :

- The present context represents a golden opportunity to clean up the press situation. Also, the Constitution, and its contribution, brings the press some guarantees of favorable conditions for the exercise of its noble functions.
- The will of the State to bring support to press enterprises by means of the framework convention
- A high interest shown by international NGOs in the press situation in Morocco (e.g. Human Rights Watch, Reporters Sans Frontières, CNDH). These organizations are all fervent defenders of journalists.
- Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, Morocco remains a country where press freedom exists. The daring editorial lines of some independent press are the best support for this claim. Morocco is less and less listed as an internet-censuring country.
- The press sector analysis denotes that the enterprises involved in this trade are hardly surviving. The threats heavily weighing on the sector, correlated to other weaknesses embrittle – economically speaking – this structure. On the other hand, the analysis demonstrates the existence of a real will and initiatives meant to help the press enterprises.

Media and Social Networks

Presently, our press has gone a long way towards independence. Today it has gone beyond its limits and even made breakthroughs. Still, there remain some malfunctions which block the freedom of expression and access to information.

What is currently not working ?

The press has known an important evolution in recent years. One cannot help noticing new publications of a myriad of daily newspapers ranging from general information press to specialized press. Despite this evolution, however, the following problems can be mentioned:

Both the judicial and legal levels are dysfunctional

In the recent years, many journalists have been tried before courts for press offences.⁶ These journalists were tried on the basis of the Penal Code⁷ despite the existence of a Press Code.

In the absence of an authority which has the legitimacy to enforce the press code, the journalists are tried as ordinary citizens, not as individuals exercising their functions.

It is worth noting that, on one hand, the legislation regulating the sector finds itself overshadowed by the evolution of the media and technology. On the other hand, the current Press Code should be re-drafted in order to include the electronic press.

It is urgent today to rethink the relation between the press and justice and to annul the 24 prescribed sentences in the

⁶ During the last decade, Hicham El Mellati (a magistrate) asserted that 640 cases were brought before justice, 437 out of which were tried, with 212 journalists convicted and 212 acquitted. 7 trials were rejected for irregularity.

⁷ The articles used by the justice are respectively : Article 263,264 and 266.

Press code which can lead to the deprivation of liberty.

Applied against journalists, the severe sanctions overwhelm the press enterprises' financial health, leading some of them to extinction. The last few years have marked the disappearance of many independent press magazines such as:

Nichane (Oct. 1st, 2010),
Le Journal (Jan. 25th, 2010),
Demain and ***Doumane*** (May, 2003)

These magazines' disappearances are caused either by the heaviness of the fines imposed on them or by their being boycotted by advertisers, which led to their asphyxiation and bankruptcy. The issue at stake now is to apply the Press Code, then to review its different articles and add some clauses to them, particularly those which concern the electronic press.

Article 77 of the Press Code seems to present an inconsistency, for it grants the Ministry of Interior the authority to seize, suppress or ban any publication which is likely to undermine public order. The incoherence does not lie in the banning and the seizure acts themselves, but rather in the institution which makes use of this article, since one cannot be judge and plaintiff at the same time.

Low quality press and low standards

Another shortcoming which can be spotted in the press is the media practices which are – ethically – neither strict nor professional. Editorial content is often rather amateurish and superficial. Typically the journalism to be found in Morocco does not involve deep investigations but relies on shallow analyses and the gleaning of rumors.

Media and Social Networks

One can also pinpoint two tendencies: some independent press journalists tend to make use of rumors and push the editorial line towards the showy side. Others, the partisan press, tend to re-write the agencies' news items instead of resorting to investigative reporting. Some are either eager to please or – rather – at pains not to displease, while others' *raison d'être* is to provoke the government whatever the cost.

The press enterprise finds itself faced with the risk of having its publication censored by the printer. It is true that most daily papers have their own printing houses, but the independent press magazines have been at times compelled to print their magazines abroad (France or Spain) to avoid this risk.

The journalistic profession is not restricted, nor is it reserved solely to some individuals who have undergone journalistic training. It is possible to integrate the profession through other alternative trainings such as having a "Licence" degree (= B.A) in economics, political sciences, literature or from a school of commerce. Besides, journalists receive little training, and have no access to social benefits stipulated by the Labor Code.

What are the present policies?

The media in Morocco have undergone different reforms during this last decade.

The press was first regulated by the 1958 Code, then by the 2002 Code. Thus, from one reform to another the press has gone a long way and is still heading forward.

The latest upgrade of the sector took place in 2005; its different stakeholders signed a program contract to proceed to the modernization of the press. Presently, and given the current situation, a series of actions have been undertaken by the

day government and the ministry of communication to improve the media situation in Morocco.

1) The Press Code :

The relation between the judiciary and the press

Subsequent to the jailing of journalists, the Ministry of Communication undertook some measures aiming at rethinking the press code in Morocco, while building on what has already been achieved. The reform in question will include six areas:

- Custodial sentences
- Financial sanctions and indemnities
- Publication and distribution licenses attributed to foreign publications
- Access to information
- The definition of the profession of journalists
- The legal framework regulating the electronic press

These reform elements will represent a pledge of adequacy between the new Constitution and the stakes of the press.

Media and Social Networks

The Reform parts	Contribution	Assessment
Custodial sentences	They will be reduced from 24 to 4 sentences according to the Minister of Communication	Meet the urgency of the situation and respond to the demands of the sectors' stakeholders and NGOs
Financial sanctions and indemnities	The Minister of Communication has not yet made any public declaration on the measures to be undertaken, but he asserts that they are indeed overwhelming for the press.	Meet the demands of the journalists
Publication and distribution licenses attributed to foreign publications	Foreign press also undergoes the confiscation and the banning of some its issues	-
Access to information	The question of the authorities and public services' guaranteeing the journalists access to information, will be raised, given the fact that this free access was not always possible in the past.	A measure in line with the Constitution and the journalists' demands.
The Journalists' Profession	The Code provides for no clauses dealing with the journalists' professional status	A measure which is in line with the expectations
The Electronic Press	Including the electronic press is a priority for the Ministry of Communication	A measure in line with the Sector's evolution and the obsolescence of the Present Code

2) Regulating the Profession: Setting a National Press Council

In addition to the framework law geared to the electronic press, the Ministry tackled this year the project of setting the National Press Council. This project's objective is to establish for the profession some self-regulatory measures, meant to limit tensions between the press and justice.

This body will have the power to reduce the number of resorts to justice in the press cases, and will even look for means to settle amicably some conflicts.

The National Press Council will partly deal with sanctioning measures which have been, so far, the prerogative of the justice institution. The council will be able to take a series of measures including the partial or total withdrawal of the journalist's professional card, or the press enterprise's deprivation of the State's financial support. This can also lead to the enterprise's deprivation of advertising revenues.

The question that arises today is to know whether or not the Council is a governmental project or an « inter-professional » one, says Younes Moujahid, the President of SNPM. «A Press Council must observe the internationally acknowledged standards which guarantee the independence of some similar councils ».⁸

The Constitution is crystal clear concerning the Sector's organization, as stipulated by its 28th Article⁹: the Sector's professionals should organize themselves in an independent manner, and the public authorities shall help the press in its endeavor.

⁸ Cited in *Aujourd'hui Le Maroc*, 2012-06-06 no. 2698

⁹ «The public authorities favor the Press Sector's organization and the determination of its ethical as well as legal rules on democratic bases »

Media and Social Networks

The Council's points of strength:

The National Press Council shall be made up of 15 elected members for a 4 year period. There shall be 5 electronic press editors, 5 press journalists, and 5 journalists (all media combined), coming from the most representative trade unions, in addition to 5 civil society representatives such as a retired magistrate, a lawyer and a person appointed by the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme (the Consultative Council for Human Rights). The most reputed countries in terms of human rights and whose councils work very well are the Scandinavian ones, where the diversity of the members of the council is very important. It seems in this regard the draft for the Moroccan Council is following a good example.

The draft Council related law comprises 58 articles; it stipulates that the Council will have a legal personality and shall enjoy full autonomy for its own management.

Aid allocated to the press

In 2005, the State signed a program contract with the sector's professionals in order to help modernize and boost the press enterprise. By means of some specific provisions, the program contract includes measures which are meant to accompany the press enterprise in its evolution process. It includes different aspects, namely the tax system, vocational training, advertising, upgrading, support for the enterprises ... etc. The most important contribution is support to the press which has become more precise and less arbitrary than it was a number of years ago.

Indeed, till the end of the 90s, the subsidies allocated to the press were mainly for some political parties' daily newspapers. In a totally arbitrary manner, decisions were made concerning who to subsidize and who not to. The independent press media repeatedly used to protest against this unjust system. Their mobilization led to the signature of a program contract which will lead to the unveiling of other injustices.

Still, the Ministry published analysis showing that the subsidies are beneficial to a category of enterprises at the expense of others. The analysis of the figures published in 2012 shows that a large part of the aid goes to partisan press and to press groups :

- Ecomédia: 10% of the State subsidy allocated between 2007 and 2011
- Maroc Soir: 8% of the State subsidy allocated between 2007 and 2011
- PI (The *ISTIQLAL* Party) 9,2% of the State subsidy allocated between 2007 and 2011.
- USFP [*l'Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires* (The Socialist Union of Popular Forces)] 7,2% of the State subsidy allocated between 2007 and 2011.

The Program Contract presents several advantages for the press, but it would be right to think of alternative criteria for the allocation of subsidies.

The Negative Consequences:

- The press enterprises always try to increase the number of prints even when they know that the number of unsold copies ranges between 50% and 90%. This behavior is justified by its interest for advertising, because advertisers base their judgments on the reputation, the distributions, the market presence and the number of prints issued of a given publication.

Media and Social Networks

- The subsidy proves profitable to some media groups which are already doing well and which do not really need to be state-subsidized, especially when some given groups have several publications.
- Subsidies may have some perverse repercussions in so far as they can contribute to securing some annuities for a given group at the detriment of other enterprises which have a low number of printed issues or might not meet the standards.

The aid and the program contract are aimed at enterprises with a minimum of two years of existence. When it comes to providing help for a sector and favoring creativeness, one does not start with setting this kind of hindrance. Moreover, it is during its first starting years that an enterprise must be helped to launch its project. In the scope of this program contract, innovation and free enterprise do not seem to figure on the agenda. Only those with two years of existence had access to the State subsidies. In other words, only those enterprises which already had the means to keep afloat for more than three years could have access to this aid.

Recommendations and orientations

The prevailing logic behind the recommendations should be the primacy of the journalists' rights to inform, accede to information and exercise their functions in favorable and honorable conditions. The other issue at stake is that of securing for the citizen the right to receive a reliable information away from slander or defamation.

In the light of the issues raised along this document, the recommendations will be synthesized in three major axes:



Regulations

The recommended elements for the press regulations are, first of all, to apply the code in its entirety, and not use any other regulatory framework by means of which the press can be tried when it comes to their professional activities.

It is also important to review some hardly explicit formulations of the code such as «good mores » and «public order ». It would be more judicious to provide some clearer clauses so as to come up with an unbiased and just system.

For individual journalists, it would be more judicious to establish – in addition to the membership card, a scoring card which lists all the infringements a journalist might have committed. These cumulative offenses shall lead to the definitive withdrawal of the card.

The fines imposed on enterprises found in breach of the code should also be moderated according to the size of the enterprise. There exist two profiles for the press enterprises:

Media and Social Networks

Press Profile	Characteristics	The Sanctions' financial Impact
Profile 1	Generates substantial sales and channels an important part of the advertising market.	A sanction may not have a dissuasive effect and considerably impact the enterprise
Profile 2	Does not generate enough sales and is dependent on the State's subsidies.	Exorbitant and repetitive sanctions may render fragile the enterprise's financial health

It is possible to decide the amount of the financial penalty against the breach based on the enterprise's turnover.

Furthermore, it is also essential to include in the Press Code some clauses concerning advertising, and the banning of media concentration.

The press is also regulated by means of the state–allocated subsidy. Any non-compliance with the clauses included in the program contract shall bring about the refusal of the subsidy. Still, this regulation instrument carries its own limits and should improve the following points:

- including the other press categories (such as the free and electronic press) in the framework convention in addition to the print media;
- reasoning in terms of press groups for the acquisition of subsidies. The rationale behind this is to help the enterprise modernize its equipments. In a general manner the publications shall benefit from the same technical facilities and shall be doubly assisted by the State.

Self-regulation

Due to its constitution, the National Council has a plural form including civil society professionals. The challenge facing its implementation will come from the way it should be funded. It is recommended that it should be funded by the sanctions applied against the press in order to guarantee the Council's independence.

The National Council should also consider the regular issuing of press statistics and the different cases dealt with. Presently, there exists no institution which can put together the different infringements and offenses committed by journalists. The Council must be Morocco's living memory for everything related to the press and journalists. It is unfortunate not to find published statistics on the number of journalists who were acquitted or tried, for example.

Professional Conduct

- Setting a national chart for the code of ethics which must include the journalists' contribution to the drafting.
- Restricting access to the profession either through the requirement of a degree or by obliging the prospective journalists to follow some adequate training

Media and Social Networks

Conclusion

The question at stake is to secure the right conditions for the sector, so that it can fully fulfil its role as a fourth power. The Moroccan press, however, must face the challenges raised by regulations, along with the economic reality which is weighing heavily on its financial conditions. Passing the reform bill and establishing the National Press Council would represent a step forward. However, facing the ups and downs of the information economy market is another thing altogether.

In a community based on oral traditions, many citizens draw information from the next door neighbour, and from hearsay sources. Excepting for specific socio- professional categories, the Moroccan individual is rarely looking for high quality or researched information. Besides, the publications which deal with the analysis of different public policies are written in French and are aimed at the elite. The ordinary Moroccan citizen is left wrongly and poorly informed. Accordingly, press enterprises must increase their subscription offers at reasonable prices for the youths who are presently developing an interest in economics and politics and who are going to constitute the readership of tomorrow.

It is also important to help the press enterprises to opt for the pooling of their technical assets and create printing co-operatives. Secondly, one should think of orienting the new publications towards entrepreneurial approaches for a better financial management of the press enterprise.

Sameer Hussien Al-Attar has dedicated his career to developing and implementing effective policies and programs to improve his home country of Jordan. Having graduated from the University of Jordan, where he studied business administration, Sameer has continued to expand his knowledge and abilities through various trainings and certifications. Working with the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Sameer is currently serving as the Senior Coordinator of youth productivity programs. Sameer plans to continue his work with the Jordanian government as he is driven to create a more prosperous Jordan for the future of his two- year old daughter Seleena.

Zakia Bellefqih is responsible for customer service at the Institution of Dyar Al Mansour (Subsidiary of CDG Development). Zakia previously worked as a business marketing advisor in the UNHCR program of PISERUMA in addition to participating in the socio- economic integration of refugees in Morocco under the tutelage of the same organization. Zakia's professional career did not start after graduation but was assiduously fostered when she was a student at HEM as she cofounded the Club of Solidarity where she planned events for the benefit of children in underprivileged environments. From an academic perspective, Zakia

Authors' Biographies

holds both her Bachelor in Management and a Master in Marketing from HEM. Zakia speaks Arabic, French, English and Spanish.

Meriem El Hilali is a Junior Diplomatic Counsellor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Before joining the ministry, Meriem worked as a project manager for Google cloud computing products in Morocco, Google Apps for Edu. She also received the Spot Light Award in Washington DC for her community service, promotion of English and cross cultural exchange. Meriem has a MA in International Marketing and Commercial Affairs from National School of Trade and Management in Settat, and is currently enrolled in Master Degree programme at the Moroccan Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Rabat. Her native language is Arabic, and she is fluent in English, French and Spanish.

Nadia Logab is a Project Assistant at the project of the Algerian Financial Market Reforms. Besides, she is involved with the Algerian Network of Youth and Students where she coordinates a project that aims to accord the Algerian youth more access to their political rights and increase their participation in the political life of the country. She also is an affiliated expert to the European Geopolitical Fo-

rum where she specializes in the North African geopolitical and economic sphere. Nadia was awarded a one year fully paid academic scholarship by the US Department of State to participate in the North East South Asia (NESAs) leadership and exchange program, and was elected president for a Rotaract club in South Carolina. She has been recently granted a Chevening scholarship to complete an MSc in public policy in a university in the UK. Her native language is Arabic, and she is fluent in English and French.

Mohamed Saber Abdel Hamid El-Sabbagh is a University lecturer in Human & Economic Resources Development Department - Faculty of fisheries & Marine studies in Suez Canal University. Besides delivering lectures, Mohamed conducts innovative research studies in gender, youth and social change in Egypt . Mohamed has accumulated over 10 years, an experience in the social & economic development field with national and international organizations such as the Agriculture Research Center, ACDI/VOCA, and Youth and Development Consultancy Institute. Mohamed

is extensively involved in local civil society, communicating effectively with a wide range of young volunteers and community leaders; he also participates in several training activities and programs.

Imen Yacoubi was born in Tunisia where she still lives. She obtained her BA in English language and literature and then her 'Agrégation' diploma from the Faculty of Letters, Humanities and Arts of Manouba and the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Tunis. From 2005 to 2009, she taught at the University of Gabes, and she has been teaching at the University of Jendouba since 2009. From 2007 to 2010, Imen attended the Medi-Café creative writing project under the mentorship of the British Council. She is an editor and a co-founder of *Moorings*, a cultural Maghrebi magazine in English. Currently, she is an alumnus of the Civic Engagement and Leadership Fellowship, a program accommodated by Syracuse University, NY. She is also author for Human Rights TV and for Mideast Youth. Imen is an active blogger and an interactive user of social media.

YAANI policy lab is a new kind of regional network of young policy analysts in the MENA region. Deeply engaged in a shifting political and social context, this publication features policy proposals and recommendations in the areas of education policy, youth policy, gender rights, civil society, good governance and media.

